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In recent years inuch attention has been placed on 
the subject of cost growths as related to the acquisition 
of weapons systems by the military services. Peck and 
Scherer in a study of the weapons acquisition process found 
that the average development cost prediction error for a 
sample of 12 weapons programs was 220 percent with a stand­
ard deviation of I70 percent.^ A congressional list of 35 
major weapons systems disclosed that 27 of the programs in-
pvolved cost growths totaling 19-9 billion dollars.
Simplicity appears to be the key characteristic of a 
contracting relationship between any two groups. For a
^Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons
Acquisition Process (Boston: Harvard University Press,
1962), pp. 17-^5 .
2iid
1 9 7 0, p. 17
2"Defense Digest," Armed Forces Management, January,
2
stated amoiint of money the contractor agrees to deliver to 
the governmental agency a product at a specific time in a 
stated quantity. A definite level of performance is also 
specified. Investigation reveals that the relationship can 
be a complex one, having a large number of interacting vari­
ables .
The final contract price which results between the 
government and the commercial contractor is based on esti­
mates of future costs. The estimates relate to the unknown 
future and are at best approximations which may involve con­
siderable error. The mere ambiguous and vague the specifica­
tions for the product or service being purchased the larger 
the potential range of error.
Uncertainties exist relative to program costs, de­
livery dates, and product reliability. The uncertainty pa­
rameters for a given weapon system will evidence themselves 
most dramatically in the area of costs.^ Delivery schedules 
and reliability are directly related to costs. If the con­
tractor is willing to expend unlimited funds in the face of 
technological or other problems, then the delivery schedule 
can be accomplished with the required degree of product 
quality. However, unlimited funds are not generally avail­
able. Firms face various funding constraints. The need is
^Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1 9 6 0), p. 86.
to create an approach for dealing with the program nncer-
L.tainties which are relevant.
Thus, the purpose of this study is to construct a 
conceptual cost model that will assist the government and its 
contractors in coping with the uncertainty parameters which 
could affect the costs of a sole-source, negotiated, devel­
opment contract. The type of contract selected to support a 
given program is at present the primary technique used to 
cope with this cost uncertainty. The goal is a better un­
derstanding of the weapons acquisition process that will 
result in the minimization of program and total-system costs.
The methodology of the study is predicated primarily 
on a survey of the pertinent procurement literature relating 
to government procurement and uncertainty analysis. The ap­
proach is eclectic as different concepts are selected from 
various sources for use in model building. Some observations 
will be based on personal experience with the research and 
development portion of the weapons acquisition process. Per­
taining to the weapons acquisition process and government 
procurement practices, an average level of sophistication is 
assumed.
Scherer states that a survey of the literature has 
limitations and is no substitute for careful empirical
LC. J. DiBona, Where Is Systems Analysis? 
(Arlington, Virginia; Center for Naval Analyses, 29 April
1 9 6 9), pp. 6 -7 .
research.^ This limitation is acknowledged. However, re­
search on individual development programs is extremely com­
plex and time consuming. Considerable difficulty has been 
experienced in trying to compile detailed cost data and case 
histories for military research and development programs.^
A model is an abstraction from reality and has cer­
tain inherent limitations. The variables in a specific 
model interact with the larger system of which the model is 
a part. This factor requires some variables to be held con­
stant as one or several others are manipulated. However, 
even with abstractions a model may have utility if the result 
is a better understanding of the subject being examined. Ad­
ditionally, some factors defy quantification.̂  These quali­
tative considerations can be evaluated and reviewed during 
the decision-making process, so as to minimize the possibil­
ity of a suboptimal decision.
At the outset the study will consider the broad 
aspects of the weapons acquisition process. This material 
will furnish the foundation for later, parts of the paper.
“'Frederic M.̂ Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Proc­
ess; Economic Incentives (Boston: Harvard University Press,
i96if), p. 14.
Burton H. Klein, The Decision-Making Problem in De­
velopment (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation,
February, I960), p. 2.
^Philburn Ratoosh, "Defense Decision-Making: Cost-
Effectiveness Models and Rationality," in Weapon System De­
cisions, ed. by Davis B. Bobrow (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 3 0 .
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The specific focus will be the development portion of the 
research and development spectrum. Efforts to reduce un­
certainty must start early in the program. Maximum effort 
can be applied to minimize developmental costs. At this 
point, the concern is with subsystems which will later be 
aggregated to form a given weapon system. However, the 
various parts of the weapons acquisition process are inter­
related, and subsequent discussions will reflect this inter­
dependency.
Costs growths may occur as the result of post­
acquisition actions, and this fact will be considered in 
terms of the model that is developed. The model will reflect 
the static nature of the procurement-planning period. Costs 
are to be estimated for a future period. The future is re­
plete with uncertainty. This uncertainty needs to be re­
duced to increase the efficacy of defense decisions. Dynamic 
aspects of the situation will be considered. The passage of 
time will validate or refute the actions taken during the 
prenegotiation phases of the procurement cycle. High-quality 
information is necessary to determine the status of program 
costs at any point during the program. Such data will be 
the basis for decisions to effectively control costs.
Thus, the detailed plan evolves from the general to 
the specific. Chapter II introduces the research and de­
velopment spectrum, and other significant procurement con­
cepts. The weapons acquisition process and the procurement
6
cycle are the important aspects of Chapter III. The defense 
industry and certain of its characteristics are the prime 
topics of Chapter IV. In Chapter V the measurement of risk 
and uncertainty is examined. A consideration of contractual 
incentives follows. The cost growth problem is considered 
in Chapter VII, and in Chapter VIII the attempts to cope with 
the cost-growth problem are explored. Chapters IX and X de­
velop the general and specific versions of the model. The 
final Chapter contains the conclusions.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH AM) DEVELOPMENT PR0CUREÎ4ENT
Environmental change requires the modification of 
weapons. A given weapon must conform to the current tech­
nological state-of-the-art. This necessity often stimulates 
the creation of new and more complex weapon systems. An­
other stimulus affecting system and system component change 
are the operational problems. They become apparent as a 
weapon is required to perform over an extended time period 
and in several different capacities. The necessity for new 
ideas and the derived applied concepts is a constant char­
acteristic of the military-planning environment. Many ideas 
result in no meaningful technical progress. The only bene­
ficial conclusion is that the technical approach under con­
sideration will not work. The process leading from an idea 
to a system component or system can be thought of as a con­
stantly evolving spectrum.
The Research and Development Spectrum 
The continuum originates with the research stage and 
continues through exploratory and advanced development to
7
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engineering development. The latter is often referred to as 
full-scale development. The nature of the spectrum is dy­
namic when considered from the standpoint of more than me 
idea. New ideas have their genesis at each stage of the 
spectrum, so the continuum is constantly being expanded. The 
first three stages are preacquisition in a system context.
In the full-scale development stage the term, acquisition, 
has meaning. The four stages are considered below.^
Research.— This stage envisions research for its own 
sake. Basic research and those elements of applied research 
which are directed toward the expansion of scientific infor­
mation are included. The over-all goal is an expansion of 
general knowledge in the physical, biological, medical, be- 
haviorial, social, and engineering sciences. A project may 
yield only the information that a specific technique will not 
work.
Exploratory development.— As contrasted to research, 
the goal is to explore the feasibility of applying new ideas 
to military weapons and equipment. Now a part of the stage, 
applied research was the descriptive term for the whole stage 
several years ago. The spectrum classifications are somewhat 
arbitrary and overlapping.^ The budget process in the main
Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense 
(Berkeley, California; University of California Press,
1 9 6 5), pp. 3 6-3 7.
^Arthur Ahlin, "Firm Fixed Price Contracting for 
Development," NCMA News Letter Anthology. Vol. No. 1,
9
dictates the lines of demarcation to be established. Ex­
ploratory development is more delimited. The product of the 
research stage may be a technical report. In exploratory 
development the result may be a prototype or "bread-board" 
model.
Advanced development.— The effort is narrowed in this 
stage. The goal is the application of the idea to a specific 
military purpose or problem. Experimental hardware is de­
veloped and tested for its suitability to military purposes. 
If the tests are favorable, a decision may be forthcoming to 
design and engineer the component for actual service use.
The program scope can vary w i d e l y .  ̂ For example, North 
American Aviation's X-15 required expenditures of tens of 
millions of dollars over many years, and the Advanced f4anned 
Strategic Aircraft (AI4SA) cost eighty million dollars to de­
velop.
Engineering development.— This stage encompasses the 
development of a particular system engineered for specific 
service use but not yet approved for production and deploy­
ment. The C-5j F-111, and F-15 are examples of aircraft that 
experienced cost problems during the stage.
1 9 6 8-1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 0 (Inglewood, California: National Contract
Management Association, June, 1970), p. 10?.
■J■̂ Martin Meyerson, "Price of Admission into the De­
fense Business," Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1967»p. 1 1 6.
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Nature of Research and Development Procurement
The costing of a given program is most difficult in 
the research stage. The specifications are represented by a 
rather vague and nebulous statement of work. The purpose of 
this work statement is to furnish the contractor general 
guidance, and to restrict the effort to a given scientific 
field. Yet, the guidance must not be too rigid or the aca­
demic freedom of the researchers may be abridged. Stringent 
curtailment of academic curiosity may stifle the spark of 
creativity mandatory for scientific progress. When this con­
dition prevails, the end result is a wasted expenditure of 
funds. A knowledge of what is being purchased is the key to 
the preparation of individual.cost estimates. Each cost cat­
egory needs to be explored to determine its extent and the 
bases for possible cost variations. These estimates will be 
aggregated to determine total contract costs. This same 
generic type of problem is inherent in the other three stages. 
However, as the spectrum is traversed the specifications be­
come more definitive. The core of the problem is that a goal 
or series of goals are being obtained, not a hardware product. 
The research and development spectrum occurs in an environment 
characterized by technological, cost, and other related un­
certainties. In the area of uncertainty, the unknowns are 
greatest in the research stage, and decrease as a program 
passes across the spectrum. The uncertainties decrease over 




Technological change stimulated by the passage of 
time may induce the awareness that a certain type of weapon 
system must be developed or improvements made to an existing 
system. Plans are formulated and a definite requirement is 
substantiated. The desideratum for an advanced development 
program may be the result. The agency responsible for action 
will attempt to translate the requirement into detailed 
specifications. The next step is to locate the government
»
activity best suited to conduct the program. Assuming no 
military agency has the capability, a civilian source will 
be utilized.
The program may be unique and require technical 
specialization. In this instance, only one source will be 
solicited. Increasing complexity and the growth in scope of 
weapon systems has permitted such specialization. For ex­
ample, a firm develops an expertise in inertial guidance for 
missiles. Faced with a limited market, the firm is able to 
exist by product specialization. This type of procurement 
is designated sole source and means that one source was so­
licited. A sole-source situation exists also when only one 
firm is available, and submits an unsolicited proposal. 
Studies by the Logistics Management Institute have revealed 
that in fiscal year 1969, sole-source procurements accounted 
for 60 percent of the total procurement dollars and 73
12
percent of the total procurement actions.^ The significance 
of this condition is the monopolistic market relationship 
which results. Competition is not a stimulus to regulate 
cost. Instead, possible methods of controlling program costs 
are the focal point of negotiations.
In some cases, competition can be part of the ac­
quisition process. When this situation occurs, proposals are 
solicited from several firms, having products or services 
which are close substitutes for one another. A source file 
is reviewed, and those contractors which appear technically 
qualified are requested to submit proposals. In fiscal year 
1969) ^0 percent of the procurement dollars and 27 percent 
of the procurement actions were categorized as multi-source 
competitive solicitations.
The requirement for a change to an existing weapon 
system or for the development of a new one may be detected 
by an individual firm in the defense industry. The technical 
proposal is prepared and submitted to the pertinent military 
service on an unsolicited basis. Such a situation will gen­
erally result in a sole-source procurement action, if the 
proposal is deemed technically acceptable. This type of 
business practice is often advantageous to defense firms.
^Logistics l-Ianagement Ins itute. Briefings on Defense 
Procurement Policy and Weapon SysLeins Acquisition (Washington,




Should the development project be successful, the firm based 
on its technical knowledge is almost certain to receive 
follow-on procurements for continued development. Even­
tually, the firm may even receive a sole-source-production 
contract.
The economic significance of sole-source procurements 
is that competition is not available to stimulate efficient 
resource allocation. Cost estimates are based on historical 
data. Perhaps inefficient operations in the past form the 
basis for cost data, then average total costs will be higher 
than warranted.^ Studies have disclosed that adequate speci­
fications plus two or more qualified sources can result in 
reductions in price of about twenty-five percent on the 
average.^
Contract Placement
The U.S. Government maintains a limited public-owned 
laboratory and production capability. Consequently, goods 
and services are primarily procured from the private sector 
of the economy. Procurements are placed by two methods.
Formal advertising.— By statute advertising is the 
preferred procurement-placement methodology. The goal is to
^James E. Hibdon, Price and Welfare Theory (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19&9), P* 26M-.
?The Southwestern Legal Foundation, Government Con­
tracts and Procurement (New York: Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1963), p. 2 0 7.
lit
oobtain the highest degree of competition possible. This 
method is best for items standard in nature with a fairly 
long record of production, such as food products, automotive 
parts, clothing goods, and furniture. The required goods are 
detailed in a public advertisement, that solicits bids from 
all ccmpanies wanting to participate. Respondents submit 
sealed bids which are opened at a specific time and place 
under very rigid procedures. The procurement is awarded to 
the lowest bidder. Research and development projects seldom 
conform to the criteria for formal advertising.
Negotiation.— Procurements not placed by formal ad­
vertising are generally placed by negotiation. The Logistics 
Management Institute cites two basic differences between ad­
vertising and negotiation.^ First, no public opening of 
bids occurs, and secondly, the award does not necessarily go 
to the lowest bidder. This second factor results from the 
premium placed on technical competency. Price is certainly 
a factor considered in research and development. However, 
the need for a high-quality product and the best over-all 
contractual arrangement may override price considerations.
On the average, approximately 90 percent of all defense
oU.S., Department of the Air Force, Air University, 
Extension Course Institute, Introduction to Air Force Pro­
curement, Vol. 1, Course 6500, Procurement Officer (Amarillo 
Air Force Ease, Texas; Air Training Command, 1 April 1971), 
pp. 1-3.
^Logistics Management Institute, op. cit.. pp. 2-3.
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contracts by dollar volume are contracted on a negotiated 
b a s i s . T o  be more specific, in fiscal year 1970 the per­
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Fig. 1.— Procurement concept relationships
Graphic Summary 
The procurement concepts considered in this chapter 
are related and interdependent. (See Figure 1.) The ad­
vanced development network is the only one extended; how­
ever, the same alternatives exist for the other stages.
lOiiThe Profit Puzzle in Procurement," Business Week, 
March 6, 1971, p. 44.
11 "Defense Profits to Rise," The Norman (Okla.)
Transcript. June 1, 1971, p. 3.
CHAPTER III
THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
The research and development continuum encompasses 
research, exploratory development, advanced development, and 
engineering development. The total weapons acquisition proc­
ess is obtained by adding the production and operational de­
ployment phases. Definitionally, weapons acquisition is the 
conception, development, and production of technically ad­
vanced weapon systems.^ A weapon system represents an inte­
gration of individual parts to form a complex whole. Opera­
tional, maintenance, and other support functions are in­
cluded.^ An airplane, submarine, tank, or ship are examples.
Weapon Acquisition Phases 
From a contractual standpoint the weapon procurement 
process can be segmented into four phases. (See Figure 2.) 
Conceptually, this subdivision permits contracts to be
^Scherer, op. cit.. p. 1.
2Logistics Management Institute, op. cit.. p. 35*
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negotiated at the beginning of each phase, so as to encompass 

























Fig. 2.— Research and development conceptual inte-
Source; Hudson B. Drake, "Major DOD Procurements at War 
with Reality," Harvard Business Review (January- 
February, 1970)? PP* 129-131.
Concept formulation.— This phase includes the re­
search, exploratory development, and advanced development 
parts of the research and development spectrum. Since the 
advanced development phase is included, and a sequential pro­
gression is involved, a specific military application is con­
templated. Experimental hardware is developed on a proto­
type basis and tested to obtain more information as to the
3Hudson B. Drake, "Major DOD Procurements at War with 
Reality." Harvard Business Review. January-February, 1970,
p. 1 2 7.
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feasibility of the project design. The goal is to clearly 
delimit the military requirement and to identify the best
kalternative method for accomplishing it. For those programs 
which seem to hold promise an objective emerges which will 
provide a basic developmental strategy for the future. The 
phase can be from one to five years duration.
Contract definition.— Information gained from the 
concept formulation segment is applied. Two or more con­
tractors are selected to competitively define the develop­
mental effort. The emphasis is on planning. Each contractor 
must execute a preliminary program design, evaluate technical 
and schedule objectives, outline in detail the development 
and production program, and extrapolate the program costs. 
Such a pains taking routine is expected to reveal the risks 
and uncertainties inherent in the program.^ Both the concept 
formulation and the contract definition phases can be classi­
fied as preacquisition segments, as related to the integra­
tion of the component parts into one or several weapon sys­
tems. An evaluation of the phase results can result in a 
decision to proceed. This period is of approximately six 
months duration.
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense.
Appendix E. Staff Report on Major Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Process (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, July, 1970),
p. 1.
^Richard M. Anderson, "Anguish in the Defense Indus­
try," Harvard Business Review, November-December. 1969.
p. 166: ’ ’
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Engineering development.— The decision to develop an 
item for operational use leads to this phase. The specifica­
tions are more rigorously refined. The full-scale system 
will be developed and tested. The phase precedes production 
and is crucial for validating the design of the weapon system 
and may cover from two to four years.
Production and operation.— The weapon system has be­
come a reality. The component units have been successfully 
integrated, and the decision has been made to produce the 
item. As the weapon systems come off the assembly line, per­
sonnel are trained in their use, and the systems are placed 
in the operational inventory. Though not considered in this 
study, support and maintenance are the next steps. The 
weapon system is operational until new technology stimulates 
modifications or the development of a different weapon. The 
cycle then is repeated.
Historical Perspective^
Two factors characterized the weapons acquisition 
process in Colonial times. These factors were generality and 
simplicity. The weapons technology was based on a society 
where men used weapons daily for gleaning a livelihood. Man­
ufacturers and merchants could easily adapt to military pro­
duction of items, such as rifles, hunting knives, and gun 
powder. Thus, weapons were general in nature and low cost
^Logistics Management Institute, o p . cit.. pp. 39-78.
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production was possible. Also weapons were simple. The 
warship from a definitional standpoint was the most complex 
weapon which can be designated as a system. From a produc­
tion reference point, weapons were produced by both private 
and public concerns. Competition existed between private 
companies as related to the selling of arms to the govern­
ment and between private and public concerns. This situation 
existed in principle until World War. I. The Industrial Revo­
lution had set in motion technological forces which had been 
applied in a fragmentary fashion to local conflicts. World 
War I consolidated the various scientific advances. The re­
sult was the increasing use of weapon systems, such as the 
airplane, submarine, and tank. The trend was toward greater 
complexity and specialization. The successful application 
of many scientific advances to weapons development led to 
increased expenditures which resulted in more technical 
breakthroughs.
The United States entered World War II at a techno­
logical disadvantage. Technical advances had occurred but 
were introduced primarily into the commercial area during the 
interwar period. Instead of merely trying to cope with the 
technical advances of the enemy, the country forged ahead.
The tendency of weapons development to press the limits of 
existing knowledge was accentuated. Many new weapon systems 
were placed in the operational inventory. The atomic bomb 
and the proximity fuse were created. Advances were made in
21
information technology. Increased complexity and specializa­
tion resulted in changes in the governmental organization 
structure. The Department of Defense was reorganized. A 
defense industry came into being in this technical and un­
certain environment.
In the decade of the 1950's a technological revolu­
tion occurred. Systems, such as the Semi-Automic Ground En­
vironment (SAGE), M-48 tank, the F-4 Phantom II fighter, were 
developed. They were created in response to a continuing 
external threat to the country.
This threat resulted in the acceptance of a large 
standing military force in a constant state of readiness. In 
order to provide the weapon systems needed, a permanent de­
fense industry came into existence. From a historical stand­
point the weapons acquisition process evolved from a rather 
simple process effected in a simplistic environment to a com­
plex procedure which has to be conducted in a highly struc­
tured milieu. The military products evolved from general 
ones used by the majority to complex ones used only by a 
minority. The products are used in small quantities and must 
be manufactured by specialized firms which practice market 
segmentation and product specialization.
The Procurement Cycle 
At each interface between a procurement phase a con­
tract or contracts will be negotiated. Each contract has a 
life cycle commonly referred to as the procurement cycle. In
22
Figure 3 this cycle for an unsolicited sole-source procure­
ment is outlined.
Procurement ^ Contract ^Contract
Planningt Negotiations Fina:LizedIMilitary
Requirement
Contractor Contract^. Contract 1
Proposal ^ Closed Administration
Fig. 3.— Contract life cycle
Contractor proposal.— The prospective contractor 
recognizes the need for a certain weapon component. Seizing 
this opportunity, a proposal is prepared which outlines the 
technical program to be pursued. A cost budget is prepared. 
The cost budget indicates the total costs to be incurred in 
conducting the program. At this point the budgetary figures 
are estimates. Only the passage of time can truly refute or 
validate them. The proposal is submitted to a government 
organization which has primary interest in the contemplated 
technical area. An assumption is made that the proposal is 
submitted to an Air Force agency which funds development 
projects.
Requirement validation.— After receipt the Air Force 
organization will evaluate the proposal from a technical and
23
cost standpoint. At this juncture the technical merits of 
the program are of paramount importance. Assuming the pro­
posed developmental effort meshes with an Air Force require­
ment, the program will he approved for funding. Internal 
documents are prepared and the procurement section of the 
organization will be requested to negotiate a contract to 
support the developmental endeavor. The actual process is 
more complicated, but is being abstracted for simplicity.
Procurement planning.— This point in the procurement 
life cycle is critical. Multiple complex variables must be 
definitively evaluated. Cost, delivery dates, and quality 
must be established. The study deals primarily with the cost 
element and will, thus, hold the other two prime factors con­
stant. The contract specifications have a significant effect 
as related to the probability of a cost growth. These speci­
fications must be accurately evaluated on a cost basis. The 
cost-evaluation problem will be explored in greater detail 
in a section devoted to cost analysis. From a static stand­
point, this part of the procurement cycle will be one of the 
critical aspects of the contemplated model.
Contract negotiations.— The process can be character­
ized as a bilateral monopoly market situation.^ Assuming a 
sole-source procurement, the firm is a monopolistic seller. 
The government buyer is the only one interested in buying and
^Hibdon, OP. cit.. p. 2 6 7 .
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is, therefore, a monopsonistic buyer. This relationship is 
important and its implications will be explored. During the 
negotiation process a multiplicity of variables and rela­
tionships are examined and agreement reached. Among the 
variables are contract price, type of contract, delivery 
dates, and product quality. A contract price is an aggregate 
of estimates comprised of manhours, materials required, 
equipment needed, and other cost items. Should a significant 
variance occur in any one of the estimates, a contract cost 
growth may occur. Thus, the negotiation procedure is an im­
portant aspect of cost control.
Contract finalization.— This step involves statutory 
reviews by the procuring agency of the negotiated arrange­
ment. A contract which reflects the negotiation agreements 
is written and sent to the contractor for analysis and signa­
ture. After the contractor signs the document, the govern­
ment contracting officer is in a position to review the con­
tractor's exceptions, if any, and then to sign the document 
also. The contract is now a legally binding agreement which 
basically requires that a given product be produced in a 
given quantity with a specific quality and that delivery be 
made at a designated time. The stipulated price also en­
visions delivery to a definite geographical location. The 
product may range from a hardware item to a paper report.
Contract administration.— Most contracts are assigned 
to either the specific service for research and development
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contracts, or to the Contract Administration Services (CAS) 
in the case of production contracts for administration. Con­
tract administration includes the production, inspection and 
delivery of the product (whether report or hardware item) to 
the purchasing activity or its designated representative.
The procurement planning and negotiation phase may consume 
from one to twelve months. The administration period may 
cover several years. Many variables must interact in a pre­
determined manner to produce a product and to deliver it. 
Should one of these elements go out of control, cost vari­
ances can occur.
Contract closure.— After the production items have 
been delivered and accepted by the government, final payment 
is made. The contract is now completed and may be retired to 
the inactive file.
Summation.— On an over-all basis, a contract may span 
a time period of several years' duration. (See Figure 4.) 
Dollars are expended over time on line IqT. The assumption 
of a uniform expenditure rate is made. At tQ the contract is 
negotiated and a total price is determined. The future is 
uncertain and unknown. As a result of any number of circum­
stances, costs may be higher than anticipated (line segment 
tgS). The cost growth is represented by the segment RS.
Proper feedback during administration will reveal the deviant 
elements of cost. Investigation can be initiated to ascertain
26
the causes. Thus, in Figure 4, the two primary aspects of 
the procurement cycle are brought into focus. First, cost 
growths occur over time during administration; and secondly, 
factors considered at tQ, when the contract was negotiated 
may cause variances from line IqT. The implications and ex­







Fig. M-.— Contract expenditures
Cost Analysis 
A distinction must be made between cost and price
oanalysis. The latter term refers to the evaluation of 
prices as proposed by a contractor. This procedure usually 
requires a comparison with past prices paid, catalogue list
o
U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air University, 
Extension Course Institute, Procurement by Negotiation, Vol. 
5> Course 6500, Procurement Officer (Amarillo Air Force 
Base, Texas: Air Training Command, 1 April 1971)> pp. 60-62,
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prices or other comparative techniques to determine whether 
or not a price is fair and reasonable to the government.
Price analysis is applicable to fixed-price contracting of 
off-the-shelf hardware items. Cost analysis involves detailed 
analysis of the elements which are contained in a prospective 
contractor's cost proposal. This procedure is imperative for 
a sole-source, negotiated program where the specifications 
are relatively vague and nebulous. Cost categories, such as 
direct labor, direct materials, special best equipment, 
travel expense, and subcontracting would be evaluated as to 
fairness.9 Evidence derived from independent studies by the 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel supports the contention that an un­
warranted degree of confidence is placed in cost estimates.
In many advanced development programs, where a goal, rather 
than a product, is being procured, cost prediction is diffi­
cult. When a contractor submits technical and cost proposals 
to a government activity, the contracting officer must ascer­
tain the validity of the cost estimates. The contractor may 
have prepared the estimates by a comparison to a similar 
program. Previous estimates are increased by a certain per­
centage. Assuming a cost increase of 10 percent, an estimate
9u.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Sys­
tems Command, Air Force Laboratory Procurement Management. 
AFSCP 70-3 (Washington, D.C.: Andrews Air Force Base,
30 June 1967), pp. ^ -8 to 5-1*
^^Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President 
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense 
(Washington, D.C.: Department ol Defense, 1 July 1970),
pp. 83-84.
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on a similar program of 100 dollars is titmsformed into a 
1 1 0-dollar estimate for the new program.
Once these estimates are reduced to writing, they 
seem to assume an aura of infallibility. The fallacy of 
this posture stems from the uncertain nature of the future.
The possibility of environmental change makes future cost 
variability almost inevitable.11 The law of large numbers 
may permit the detailed estimates to offset one another to 
some extent. The occurrence of this condition is not certain. 
Thus, the decision-maker needs to insure that in the cost- 
analysis process every effort will be made to reduce the cost 
uncertainties inherent in a given research and de elopment 
program.
%. Sutherland, Fundamentals of Cost Uncertainty 
Analysis (McLean, Virginia; Research Analysis Corporation, 
March, 1971), pp. 1-2.
CHAPTER IV 
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT
The structure of the defense industry has evolved 
based on implosive inputs of a political, social, and eco­
nomic nature. The continuing external threat, after World 
War II, led to the acceptance by the American public of a 
large standing military force and the growth of a specialized 
permanent defense industry. Several definitions have been 
applied to the defense industry. Kayloe concludes that the 
industry is composed of firms which produce the following 
items: aircraft, missiles, arms and ammunition, electronics,
control and command equipment, and ships.^ This definition 
relies on product characteristics. According Peck and 
Scherer, the industry may be described in ter is of product 
categories, economic roles, contractual arrangement, and by 
size.2 An acceptable definition is that the defense in­
dustry is composed of those firms which sell products and
A. Kayloe, "Resource Allocation and Control in the 
Weapon Acquisition Process" (rough manuscript of book. Air 
Force Institute of Technology, 1970), p. 2.
2Peck and Scherer, op. cit.. pp. 11116.
29
30
services either directly or indirectly to the Department of 
Defense (DOD).
DOD-Contractor Relationship 
Many of the political, social, and economic factors 
which have had a deterministic impact on the structure of 
the industry accrue from the relationship between the DOD and 
its contractors. Scherer indicates that this relationship is 
analogous to bilateral monopoly.^ The relationship places 
the buyer in a monopsonistic position and the seller in a 
monopoly role. Berhold considers the government to be a 
monopsonist. However, he states that several contractors 
can generally provide a given product and thus, is a member 
of an oligopoly which can produce weapons to specification.^ 
The large number of sole-source, negotiated procurements 
would seem to validate the bilateral monopoly relationship. 
However, at any given time other economic market classifica­
tions may well apply. This study will abstract from these 
exception-type situations.
Environmental Characteristics 
Economic forces interact to create a relationship 
which sets the defense industry apart from the general
3Scherer, op. cit.. p. 1 5 6.
^Marvin H. Berhold, An Analysis of Contractual In­
centives (Los Angeles, California: University of California,
Los Angeles, Western Management Science Institute, September, 
1967), p. 5.
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business c o n m n m i t y Six basic interrelated factors comprise 
these forces:




(5) Industrial specialization, and
(6 ) External and internal uncertainty.
The high-dollar cost of developing weapon systems 
requires a firm which has a large working-capital base. The 
factor is not so pervasive, if only subsystem or component 
work is envisioned. In the systems concept formulation and 
contract definition phases two or more firms may bid on a 
program. As the project progresses into the system develop­
ment phase, the unsuccessful firms are eliminated from compe- 
tition. This situation contributes to the cited sole-source- 
procurement methodology. An environment of no competition is 
enhanced by the fact that firms will specialize in a given 
research and development discipline to insure a constant 
demand for their products.
Demand uncertainty derives in part from the nature 
of the products which are needed by the government. Weapon 
systems and components are developed to fulfill a given
^Peck and Scherer, op. cit.. p. 17.
^Logistics Management Institute, DOD-Contractor Re­
lationship— Preliminary Review (Washington, D.C.: Logistics
Management Institute, March, 1970), p. A-2.
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requirement created by an existing technological state-of- 
the-art. Continued research has a tendency to make such 
items, obsolete. Weapons have a specialized use. Usually 
only a small number will be required. Another factor is the 
reality of budget limitations. Congress authorizes funds 
for the DOD. The military services in allotting funds to 
weapons investment projects are generally subject to funding 
constraints.
The primary defense contractors subcontract many 
component parts to small business firms. Transportation and 
other factors lead to a concentration of activity in the 
defense industry. The study by Peck and Scherer indicated 
that ten states led by New York, Michigan, and Ohio ac­
counted for 7 0 . 6 percent of the total contract awards for 
the period 1959-1960.^ Two factors are of interest. During 
the 1960 period the geographical concentration for defense 
work began to change. Congressional action was initiated 
directing the procuring agencies to spread the business among
othe different geographic areas of the country. Also a trend 
toward geographical decentralization by industry has been de­
tected.  ̂ These two factors might impinge on the future costs 
of weapon components and systems.
^Peck and Scherer, op. cit.. p. 111.
^Ibid.. p. 1 1 3.
Q Ĵames A. Constantin, Principles of Logistics Man­
agement (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), pp. 517- 
533»
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According to the Harvard Business Review, 22,000 
prime contractors, and 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 subcontractors participate in 
the defense industryThis condition leads to a situation 
where numerous subsystems are being developed simul­
taneously A given subsystem delivers its products to an­
other subsystem which eventually inputs to the major system. 
Substantial risk is involved, as a failure in any subsystem 
can disrupt the production process and result in increased 
costs. Such a relationship creates a network of firms which 
are dependent on the government and one another for business. 
In this web-like structure price accretion occurs, as the 
subcontractors pass their costs on to the next higher tier 
until the final component cost is charged against the prime 
contract. Unless adequate cost control is exercised, a cost 
growth for the prime contract can occur. Production de­
pendence contributes to the concentration of defense dollars 
in a relatively small group of companies. In fiscal year
1 9 6 8, five firms had prime contracts for military business
1Pin excess of one billion dollars each. The firms were 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, General Electric Company, and 
United Aircraft Corporation. In fiscal year 1969, four of
^^Jack Raymond, "Growing Threat of Our Military- 
Industrial Complex," Harvard Business Review. May-June, 1968, 
p. 57.
^^Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits vs. 
Risks (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Inc., June, 1971), p. 3.
^%ayloe, op. cit., p. 2 9 •
3^
the companies repeated this achievement.^^ United Aircraft 
Corporation fell to .997 billion dollars of defense business. 
Thus, large defense contractors with much financial and 
political clout negotiate with the government in a bilateral 
monopoly-market situation.
The final environmental factor is the uncertainty 
inherent in the research and development spectrum. Glennan 
considers uncertainty to be the dominant environmental char­
acteristic and posits a dichotomous classification.^^ The 
two groups are internal and external. The frame of reference 
is the individual system or project. Factors, such as the 
future nature and objectives of military forces, the effec­
tiveness of these forces, and alternative ways to obtain the 
objectives, are classified as external uncertainties. For 
example, a given state-of-the-art may dictate that a certain 
weapon system be developed. Scientific advancements occur. 
New technology induces a state of obsolescence for the ini­
tial system or subsystem. The Snark and Navaho cruise mis­
siles illustrate the point.^^ Demand uncertainty was treated 
separately and is a manifestation of an external variable. 
Internal uncertainties interact with the external ones in a
^^"Who Pulled in the Big Ones," Business Week. 
November 8 , 1969, p. 130.
1i+T. K. Glennan, Jr., "Research and Development," in 
Defense Management, ed. by Stephen Erke (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 2 7 6 .
^^Ibid.. p. 277.
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stimulus-response relationship. Internal uncertainties com­
prise the second class. These uncertainties include factors 
such as technical design difficulties, component integration, 
and financial stability of the company.
The environmental characteristics have been con­
sidered sepEirately, when in fact they interact directly with 
one another. The situation exists in terms of industrial 
specialization. The DOD has a specialized demand for unique 
highly complex weapon components and systems. A highly 
specialized industry has evolved to supply the needed goods 
and services.
The political and social elements relate to the legal 
restrictions placed on the industry by the legislative and 
the judicial branches of the government.First, the firm 
dealing with the Federal Government is contracting with a 
sovereign power. The courts have often favored the govern­
ment as a contracting party. An example is the governmental 
immunity from suit except when it has consented to be sued. 
Secondly, certain statutory clauses are required in contracts, 
such as Buy American, Davis-Bacon, and Walsh-Healy. These 
clauses have a special economic or social goal in mind. Im­
plementation and adherence can cost the firm more than on a 
contract for commercial work. This fact follows from the
^^Procurement and Finance Council, Risk Elements in 
Government Contracting (Washington, D.C.; Aerospace In­
dustries Association of America, Inc., October, 1970),pp. 1-3 .
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extra paperwork generated, if from nothing else. Thirdly, 
the Congress has agencies, such as the General Accounting 
Office which investigate the procurement practices of the 
DOD and report to Congress and indirectly to the American 
public. Therefore, defense business is conducted under the 
scrutiny of the Congress and the public. Finally, the 
legislative branch of the government appropriates the funds 
for the DOD and other government agencies. A reduced fund­
ing level following a year of large expenditures may well 
result in overcapacity in the defense industry. The inter­
related nature of the firms will cause a reduction to be felt 
throughout the industry and the country. The reduction will 
spread with a multiplier effect, eliminating jobs and idling 
equipment and facilities. The characteristics considered in 
this Chapter either result from the nature of uncertainties 
or from the efforts that are taken to cope with them. A 
better understanding of the uncertainty parameter is required.
CHAPTER V
THE MEASUREMENT OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
From a simplistic frame of reference, uncertainty is 
the absence of information. For decision-making purposes, 
when all information about the future is known, there is no 
reason for a wrong decision. The uncertainty spectrum is il­
lustrated in Figure 5- A decision maker may be located at 
any point on the spectral continuum. Problem definition 
moves the individual to the left of the spectrum toward com­








Fig. 5»— The uncertainty spectrum
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The assumption is made that uncertainty and risk can 
be treated as synonomous terms. A review of the uncertainty 
spectrum confirms the difference between the terms as one of 
degree. Decision makers usually have some information to 
serve as a basis for decision making. Seldom will a decision 
be made when no information is available. Rather the de­
cision will be delayed, and action initiated to obtain some 
information. Risk implies that the probability of future 
events is known in terms of a probability distribution.^ Un­
certainty generally is defined as a situation where the 
probability of events is not known. From a subjective stand­
point, the decision maker usually has intuitive feelings 
about the future and is able to structure a probability dis­
tribution. This subjective estimation of probabilities will 
move the decision maker into the risk segment of the spectrum. 
A careful definition of the problem in terms of past ones of 
a similar nature will assist in enhancing the visibility of 
subconsciously submerged information. Chance,^ Grayson,8
1Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New 
York; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp. 19-21.
pWilliam A. Chance, Statistical Methods for Decision 
Making (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969),
p. 3*
Ĉ. Jackson Grayson, Jr., "The Use of Statistical 
Techniques in Capital Budgeting," in Financial Research and 
Management Decisions, ed. by Alexander A. Robichek (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 90-91.
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Bierman and Smidt,^ Robichek and Myers,^ and Lerner and 
Carleton^ support this assumption. Knight maintains that the 
two concepts should be treated as separate entities.? Hunt 
supports him.® Hunt's assertion is based on Dean's treat­
ment of the concepts.^ Dean defines the terms and treats 
them separately. Hwang in his studies takes this same ap­
proach.^® The latter three individuals concentrate their 
efforts in the risk part of the uncertainty spectrum. The 
approach taken by both groups to cope with the unpredicta­
bility of the future, however, from a conceptual standpoint 
is basically the same. Therefore, uncertainty will be 
equated with risk, since the terms are essentially indis­
tinguishable .
^Harold Bierman, Jr. and Seymour Smidt, The Capital 
Budgeting Decision (2nd ed. ; New York: The MacMillan Com-
pany, 1 9 6 7), p. 196.
^Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, Optimal 
Financing Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965)j pp. 68-69-
®Eugene M. Lerner and Willard T. Carleton, A Theory 
of Financial Analysis (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
Inc., 1 9 6 6), pp. 99-101.
^Knight, op. cit.. pp. 19-21.
^Raymond G. Hunt, personal letter, July 8, 1971 -
^Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195Dj pp. 7-8.
^®John D. Hwang, Analysis of Risk for the Materiel 
Acquisition Process. Part 1: Fundamentals (Rock Island,
Illinois: Systems Analysis Directorate, U.S. Army Weapons
Command, November, 1970), pp. 9-17.
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Taxonomie Considerations 
Various terms have been used in the literature to 
categorize and describe the types of uncertainties which 
have been identified and observed. In Table 1 these terms 
have been classified into four taxonomic classes: environ­
mental, functional, informational, and technical. The pur­
pose of these classes is to elaborate a definitional struc­
ture for reference purposes.
In a footnote. Peck and Scherer indicate that un­
certainty from a technical standpoint has no utility for 
11their study. Yet, if the uncertainty in a situation is to 
be dealt with, the gap between the colloquial meaning of the 
term and its technical meaning must be bridged. Uncertainty 
has significance when related to the future. Changes in the 
external or internal environment for a given organization 
will occur in the future. Since the future cannot be pre­
dicted, it is uncertain and in the face of unknown variables, 
a decision made in the present may well turn out to be wrong. 
Therefore, from a generic category, the merging of the en­
vironmental, informational, and technical taxonomic classes 
is necessary. The functional class is another way of de­
scribing the informational class of variables. The rela­
tionships from a definitional and sequential standpoint are 
illustrated in Figure 6.














1a. The uncertainty is related to 
natural factors, such as storms 
and floods.
b. The term relates to the impos­
sibility of being able to pre­
dict with any precision the 
actions of social and politi­
cal groups.
c. The disparities that exist in 
the access which people have to 
the various informational media. 
The differences result in ig­
norance on the part of many 
groups and individuals.
d. The passage of time results in 
changes which can distort the 
results of decisions based on a 
past state-of-affairs.
2a. These uncertainties relate to 
factors external to a project 
which can impinge on final re­
sults.
b. Internal uncertainties comprise 
those stemming from the techni­
cal approach taken, etc.
3a. The stimulus, initiating a given 
change, comes from outside the 
organization.
b. The stimulus, initiating the 
change originates within the 
organization.
h2












la. Anticipated laUnknowns S
b. Unanticipated b
Unknowns
2a. Known Unknowns^ 2a,
b. Unknown Unknowns
The firm is uncertain about its 
future income stream. The risk 
is associated with the firm’s 
operation.
The uncertainty is generated by 
the ratio of debt to equity in 
the capital structure. The 
amount of earnings available to 
common stockholders. For con­
tracting the risk of profit or 
loss on an individual contract 
is involved.
Changes in the state-of-the-art 
can render a weapon obsolete. 
Thus, uncertainty exists as to 
how long a weapon can remain in 
the operational inventory.
Most products represent an in­
tegration of component parts. 
Should a part not be available, 
then the finished product can­
not be ready on time and even 
its cost can be affected.
The unknowns in this class are 
those that a contractor is aware 
of. The problem area is an­
ticipated.
These unknowns cannot be fore­
seen.
The facts the contractor knows 
that he does not know.







la. Uncertainty 1a. The known is completely domi­
nated by the unknown. The 
probability distributions for 
future events are not known.
b. Risk^ b. A decision leads to one of a 
specific number of well defined 
alternatives. The totality of 
outcomes for a given variable 
can be described by a proba­
bility distribution.
c. Certainty c. Each decision leads to a pre­
dictable outcome. No doubt as 
to the final outcome is pos­
sible.
2a. Subjective^ 2a. The term relates to the proba­
bilities assigned to an event 
and which are wholly based on 
the observation choice.
b. Objective b. These probabilities are derived 
by specific procedures inde­
pendent of the problem being 
confronted.
^Charles 0. Hardy, Risk and Risk Bearing (Chicago, 
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1923), pp. 2-3.
^Peck and Scherer, op. cit.. pp. 17-5̂ .
cJames C. Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jerseyl Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), 
p. 1̂ 5.
%erman 0. Stekler, The Structure and Performance of 
the Aerospace Industry (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1965), p. 84.
®Peck and Scherer, o p . cit.. pp. 45-48. 
fJ. Robert Lindsay and Arnold W. Saroetz, Financial 
Management (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1 9 6 7), p. 5 3.
44
TABLE 1— Continued 
^Drake, op. cit., p. 124.
^Frank Burnham, "Plotting the Unks-Unks," Armed 
Forces Management, February, 1970, p. 55-
^Frank H. Knight, Risk. Uncertainty and Profit (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp. 19-21.
ÔD. J. White, Decision Theory (Chicago, Illinois: 








Fig. 6-— Definitional tree for uncertainty
These classes will permit a common language as re­
lated to uncertainty. For example, anticipated exogenous 
uncertainty in a situation is a variable which is external 
to the organization. The decision maker envisages a possible 
impact on the future outcome of a decision. Unanticipated 
exogenous variables are external to the organization and un­
known to the decision maker.
^5
In relation to the weapons acquisition process, un­
certainty is resolved over time. As a scientific concept 
traverses the spectrum from research through exploratory de­
velopment to production, information is gleaned from each 
stage which permits the successful solution for the emergent 
problems. In the concept formulation and contract defini­
tion phases the anticipated unknowns (exogenous and endog­
enous) are dominant. In the area of engineering development, 
the unanticipated (exogenous and endogenous) prevail. The 
uncertainty related to the concept being considered decreases 
at a uniform rate. This assumption will facilitate the ex­
position. (See Figure 7 .) One of the goals of risk analysis 
is to increase the slope of the uncertainty function.
Informational Considerations
In a theoretical context, information is difficult to 
define. In a generic sense, information is what an individual 
knows and also what he does not know. The sum is the total 
pool of knowledge. Information is rarely complete when a de­
cision is to be made. Rather, additional information is 
sought so that the uncertainty in the situation may be re­
duced.
Information may be thought of as a commodity.In 
this sense, information can be stripped of its intangible
1 pG. L. S. Shackle, Uncertainty in Economics and 
Other Reflections (London: Cambridge at the University


















Fig. 7«— The resolution of unknowns
Source; Hudson B. Drake, "Major DOD Procurements at War with 
Reality," Harvard Business Review (January- 
February, 1970), pp. 129-131*
aura and treated as a tangible item which may exhibit vary­
ing degrees of value in terms of supply and demand. For an 
organization or individual information will thus exist in 
the internal and external environments of the firm. In the 
absence of perfect knowledge about the characteristics of a 
system, the decision maker will assume a position on the un­
certainty spectrum between the two poles of uncertainty and 
certainty. Movement toward certainty and, perhaps.
if7
ultimate survival, can occur by the acquisition, use, re­
tention, and transmission of information.^^
Information Characteristics
As a commodity, information possesses several char­
acteristics. These factors can be described and measured. 
This statement is especially appropriate if information is 
considered the input commodity for a management information 
system. The information system will exist for the purpose 
of obtaining feedback about the state of an organization or 
the financial status of expenditures under a development 
contract. This feedback ideally will exhibit certain char­
acteristics.^^
Objectivity.— The goal is to eliminate bias or to 
recognize predispositions which might structure the informa­
tion in the direction of a preconceived result. Information, 
as such, is usually neutral. If the data are objective, the 
receiver of the input signal will provide any observed bias.
Validity.— An information system is designed to 
acquire certain relevant data elements. Feedback information 
must reflect this pattern.
11-'Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1961), p. I6l.
^^Robert W. Swanson, An Introduction to Business 
Data Processing and Computer Programming (Belmont. Cali- 
fornia: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1967), p. 190,
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Reliability.— The information transmitted to the 
decision maker must be free of error. Control mechanisms 
will be necessary to maintain integrity in the system.
Relevance.— The quest is for the information to re­
late to the crucial decision variables in the system. A 
review of minutia or trivial information might be interest­
ing but serves no purpose and possesses no utility for de­
cision making.
Completeness.— The acquisition of relevant data will 
permit the resolution of uncertainty in such a manner that 
suboptimal decisions can be avoided.
Usefulness.— The economics of a process require that 
the information be of a type which can be used for decision­
making purposes. Extraneous data has a definite opportunity 
cost. In economic terms, the marginal return from the in­
formation must exceed, or be equal, to the marginal cost of 
obtaining the data.
Organization.— Information in a specific system or 
universe may exhibit varying degrees of organization. En­
tropy constitutes the amount of disorder in a system.^^ In 
general, the amount of entropy tends to increase over time. 
The need is to reverse the flow. A source of negative
1 "'Ira G. Wilson and Marthann E. Wilson, Information, 
Computers, and System Design (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1967), p. 2 5 7 .
^9
entropy is necessary. Information is obtained from this 
negentropy.
Recency.— Closely related to the organization factor 
is the requirement that the information in a system be up­
dated. The tendency of the entropy in the system to in­
crease causes a degradation of existing information.
Uncertainty-Time Relationship
The degree of uncertainty present in a situation in­
creases in direct proportion to the number of unknowns in­
volved and the distance into the future of the contemplated 
events. Thus, uncertainty is a direct function of time. The 
more distant the event relative to the present, the more un­
certain is its outcome. The basis for the uncertainty is the 
absence of information concerning changes which will occur.
Change is a constant in the environment. Change is
predicated on the nature of time. Fluidity and movement
characterize time.̂  ̂ Movement is a dynamic concept and is
meaningless without a frame of reference. Time is measured
by the rotation of the earth as related to the sun and its
solar system movements. Certain characteristics can be de-
17limited for time. ' These characteristics are duration, 
tempo, sequence, chronicity, and familiarity. Duration
^Robert Sommer, "A Time for Every Purpose," Natural 
History. August-September, 1971j p. 24.
oc. cit.
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describes a time segment as circumscribed by a specific ref­
erence point. A day has a duration of 2^ hours but is mean­
ingful only in relation to the earth's rotation. Tempo re­
lates to the rate of passage. Tempo will be consistent for 
any given reference point but changes from point to point. 
Various courses of action with different sequences of events 
are possible. The occurrence of certain events may require 
the later occurrence of other dependent events. Some se­
quences are comprised of independent events. Chronicity de­
pends on the time pattern of sampling entries into a system. 
Several brief entries will provide a different perspective 
than one prolonged survey. Familiarity relates to the in­
formational cognition variable. The level of awareness varies 
from no knowledge to perfect knowledge. From a biological 
context, an organism has the opportunity to increase its 
knowledge level dependent on innate ability to detect a pat­
tern of change.
The goal is the reduction and resolution of uncer­
tainty over time. From the vantage point of the decision 
maker at tg (see Figure 8), uncertainty increases at a con­
stant rate on line tgT. This relationship can be expressed 
by the formula:
U = bt
where U represents uncertainty, b is the slope of line tgT 
(b is assumed to be a constant), and t is the variable, re­
lating to the number of time periods, as movement on the
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time continuum is contemplated. However, regarding the time 
perspective of tg, the time frame is static. The passage of 
time involves movement as information is gained from the en­
vironmental sensors in the form of feedback. Uncertainty is 






Fig. 8.— Uncertainty-time relationship
Uncertainty Elimination 
In Figure 8, uncertainty is completely resolved at 
time t̂ . The future has become the present. The decision 
made at time Iq can be evaluated as to its degree of error. 
However, such an ex post analysis is good only from a his­
torical standpoint. The goal is dichotomous. First, for 
the discussion applicable to time tg, the decision maker 
needs techniques to improve the quality of current decisions 
This fact relates to the static time frame. Secondly, in­
formational sampling on a discrete time-interval basis is
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required to permit the decision maker to modify his past de­
cisions. These actions will assure that the outcome at t̂  
or t^ is of the proper quality. The sequential acquisition 
of new information permits evaluation and control.
Uncertainty can be eliminated either by taking def­
inite action to reduce it or by transferring the risk to 
18others. Thus, in the government-contracting relationship, 
uncertainty can be transferred to the contractor or the risk 
may be shared and action taken by both parties to reduce its 
magnitude.
Individual action.— The methods for elimination or 
reduction of risk on a generic level can be summarized as 
follows :
(1) Prevention of the harmful events. An extremely 
risky part of the program is eliminated.
(2) Research to remove uncertainty. Additional data 
is captured to permit better problem definition which in 
turn leads to better solutions.
(3) Offsetting of risks. A portfolio of investments 
is combined in such a manner that the less risky investments 
tend to dampen the oscillations caused by the more riskier 
projects.
(M-) Accumulation of reserves, Contingency funds are 
accumulated to meet unexpected needs. In contracting, sup­
plemental funds are added to a program. The goal is to
^®Hardy, o p . c i t . . p .  10 .
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anticipate the occurrence of unexpected problems. If noth­
ing happens, the funds are recouped. However, an opportunity 
cost is incurred.
(5) Combination or aggregation of risks. The law of 
large numbers applies. The aggregation of individual ele­
ments absorbs the fluctuations of the individual members. 
While the behavior of one unit may be relatively uncertain, 
the behavior of the whole may be predictable within certain
limits.
Risk transfer.— The transfer of risk is important, 
as it relates to the proportion borne by the commercial con­
tractor. Various sharing ratios may be negotiated, and with 
this arrangement both parties will be interested in tech­
niques to reduce the magnitude of the risk which they face.
If the government bears all of the risk, then the contractor 
must be willing to accept a lower profit. Therefore, for 
theoretical purposes the assumption will be made that the 
two parties are going to share the risks. The exact propor­
tion is indeterminate until negotiations are completed.
Risk Measurement
As Professor Hunt asserts, risk is difficult to meas­
ure from a conceptual standpoint.^® Uncertainty was defined 
as the absence of information. In most cases decision makers
19%bid., pp. 11-31.
20H unt, OP. c i t . . p .  1
5̂
have some information available. As postulated, information 
can be considered a commodity. It can be described and meas­
ured. In most decision situations, a range of events and 
values is possible.From this starting point two measures 
of uncertainty can be used. First, probability may be used
ppas a measure of uncertainty. Then, the probability dis­
tribution for a given random variable can be used to derive 
probabilities that a certain value will oc c u r . T h e  ex­
pected value and the distribution of values around it may be 
used to predict the probability of a given event. (See 
Table 2.)
TABLE 2








Best Estimate $40,000 .4 $16,000
Next Best 60,000 .4 24,000
Least Best 85,000 .2 1 7 ,0 0 0
1.0 $57,000
Sutherland, op. cit.. p. 6 .
^2gamuel A. Schmitt, Measuring Uncertainty (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969)>pp. 2-h.
^^Van H orn e, o p . c i t . .  p .  7 1 .
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The standard deviation for the distribution in Table 2 is 
approximately $16,640. The value may be used to determine
pi>the probability of a cost less than $50,000. This proba­
bility is calculated to be .3̂ *
Thus, probability may be used as measure of uncer­
tainty. In the classical sense, probability may be applied 
when an event can occur in N ways and if of these outcomes
have an attribute p then the probability of Np is equal to;
HNp) = .
The procedures that will be used in this study will be gov­
erned by the axioms and theorems of Frisz for the probabil­
ity calcuius.For example, the sum of the probabilities 
for mutually exclusive and equally likely alternatives of a 
contemplated event must equal one.
Several useful techniques employ the "subjective" 
concept of probability.^^ The Bayesian approach is based 
primarily on the principle of degree of belief and on the 
concept of conditional probability. Bayes' formula will be 
used to compute posterior probabilities when necessary.
o Il^Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, Tables for 
Statisticians (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1950), p. 119<
^^Gerhard Tintner, Methodology of Mathematical Eco­
nomics and Econometrics (Chicago, Illinois: The University




Individuals exhibit varying attitudes toward risk.^^ 
An individual has different preferences for a risky versus a 
safe investment. Stock prices for a risky business usually 
are lower than those for sound business ventures where the 
financial risk is lower. Exceptions exist, for some people 
prefer investments with a high degree of risk and will bid 
prices up accordingly. Grayson postulates three classes of 
individuals relative to risk p r e f e r e n c e .^8
Risk seekers.— These are individuals who like to 
live daringly. They seek high-risk investments, such as 
wildcat oil wells. The person is willing to incur losses in 
the hope that a big strike will more than compensate for past 
losses.
Risk averters.— Persons who seek only low or medium 
risk situations generally attempt to avert high-risk environ­
ments. They will buy U.S. savings bonds in lieu of a highly 
speculative mining stock. An assumption will relegate the 
majority of managers to this category.
Risk ignorers.— These people ignore the existence of 
risk, hoping that it will go away. For example, a member of
^^Ralph 0. Swalm, "Utility Theory-Insights into Risk 
Ei
28,
Taking," Harvard Business Review. November-December, 1966, 
pp. 129-lW:
G rayson , o p . c i t . .  pp . 9 1 -9 2 ,
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this elite group might be an individual in the days of the 
wild west who was willing to face Billy-the-Kid in a high- 
noon shootout.
Cardinal utility theory measures an individual's at­
titude toward risk. A group of lotteries in sequence is 
posed to derive the person's utility function.The unit 
of measurement is the utile. A utility function for three 
different individuals has been plotted in Figure 9* Utiles 
are on the ordinate axis and dollars on the abscissa. In 
terms of the classes listed, A would represent a risk ig­
norer, line B a risk averter, and line C a risk seeker.
Curve B displays decreasing risk aversion.This fact means 
that the decision maker becomes less conservative as his 
asset position increases. According to Professor Hunt, 
studies of government-contractor personnel reveal them to be 
risk averters.^^ They would, therefore, possess curves which 
resemble curve B. Thus, the utility function is subjective 
and personal. No reason exists for expecting one individual's 
curve to conform to that of another. For the small business 
where one man makes the main decisions, a utility function 
may be derived. Decision rules can be formulated and author­
ity delegated to subordinates relative to the scope of
29van Horne, op. cit., p. 83*
^^John S. Hammond, III, "Better Decisions with Pref­
erence Theory," Harvard Business Review. November-December. 
1967, p. 1 3 8.
^^H unt, OP. c i t . .  p .  1 .
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Fig. 9*— Three types of preference curves
Source: John S. Hammond, III, "Better Decisions with Pref­
erence Theory," Harvard Business Review (November- 
December, 1 9 6 7), p. 1 3 8.
Individual utility theory has its bases in economic 
theory and is finding limited acceptance. However, the con­
cept of a group utility function has not found as many advo­
cates.^^ The addition of individual functions in order to 
derive a group function does not appear feasible. No common 
denominator has been posited. Two approaches have been sug­
gested.^^ The usual approach to utility function derivation
^^Bierman and Smidt, op. cit.. p. 2 8 9.
^^Ibid.. p. 2 8 9.
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is followed. Instead of an individual giving the answers, 
an entire group responds to the lottery. Secondly, after a 
series of decisions have been made, the profile of the de­
cision process is constructed and used to prepare a group 
utility function.
Cost Factors
The reduction and resolution of uncertainty over time 
can be expensive. The type of information system which will 
provide the highest quality data is the automated system.
In practice, the semiautomated data system prevails. A cen­
tral computer will direct the program to obtain data at peri­
odic intervals. These data will reflect the status of a con­
tractual program.
Two basic costs are apparent. The cost of acquiring 
the data with updates throughout the life of the system, and 
the initial cost of the hardware and its periodic maintenance, 
The situation may be likened to the model which displays the 
economic-order-quantity relationship for inventories. (See 
Figure 10). Curve A represents the increasing costs for 
more elaborate systems to obtain informational feedback.
Curve B is the cost of acquiring and updating information 
for a range of systems. This cost decreases over size, since 
the larger systems are more automated, and therefore, give a 
lower unit cost based on higher efficiency. The total costs 
are finally reflected by curve C. At point X the lowest 
point on C and the intersection of A and B the lowest cost
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system is determined. This point holds true only for the 
specific combination of variables under consideration. In­
formation which cannot be used is not to be collected. When 
timely decisions are crucial, too much information can be 
detrimental. A saturation situation occurs. Time does not 
permit thorough analysis; consequently, hasty decisions are 
made or decisions are delayed. In a sense the decision­
making process causes oscillations in the immediate activ­
ities of the organization. These oscillations are an organic 
type of instability. According to D. K. Stanley-Jones, sta­
bility in the sense of biological organisms is that of an 
oscillating, dynamic system.^^ In effect, the manager 
should receive only as much data as he can use.
Costs
Amount of Information
Fig. 10.— The optimal size information system
K. Stanley-Jones, The Kybernetics of Natural 
Systems (New York: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 1 3 0.
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The stability of the total feedback system is de­
pendent on maintaining a balance between the amount of in­
formation in the system and the cost of maintaining its in­
tegrity. Another way of expressing the cost is in terms of 
the last increment for a given time period. The additional 
information possesses utility or it is not acquired. The 
marginal value received from the increment must be greater 
than, or equal to, the marginal cost of the data. For ex­
ample, in warehouse location theory studies have shown that 
with 2 5 warehouses delivery service can be made to 90 per­
cent of the market in one day.^^ Fifty warehouses give 96 
percent coverage in one day and with 100 warehouses, 99 per­
cent of the market can be covered in one day. According to 
distribution cost analysis, the optimal number of warehouses 
is 25» Seventy-five warehouses need to be added to obtain 
an increase of only 9 percent first-day coverage. Thus, the 
marginal value is less than the marginal cost. This type of 
cost is of the fixed variety which will be continuous once 
the capability is installed.Thus, past some optimal point 
increments of information possess diminishing marginal util­
ity. The uncertainty relative to a decision may be reduced 
by using techniques to better delineate the project and to 
provide information for a better decision. Control systems 
must be developed to monitor progress and to report
^^Constantin, op. cit., pp. 401-409. 
^^Hardy, op. cit.. pp. 8-I8 .
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deviations in a timely manner. The uncertainty cannot be
completely eliminated. However, it can be reduced. The
question is how much time and resources are the pertinent
■37parties willing to pay for this uncertainty reduction.'̂ '̂  As 
startling as it may seem, a cost growth for a specific con­
tract may be less costly than the actions which would have 
to be taken to preclude its occurrence. This Chapter has 
abstracted from the government contractual environment. The 
treatment of risk in government contracts in conjunction 
with incentives will be the subject of the next Chapter.
^^D iBona, o p . c i t . . p .  8,
CHAPTER VI 
AN OVERVIElf OF CONTRACTUAL INCENTIVES
The military services have attempted to cope with 
uncertainty by the use of incentives and contractual ar­
rangements. Degree of risk bearing by contractors has been 
a key determinant of the profit allowed on a particular con­
tract. Theoretically, the more uncertainty borne by the 
contractor, the larger the profit permitted. A study by 
Seagle, though not conclusive, casts some doubt as to whether
large profits do entice contractors to accept an extremely
1high degree of uncertainty. Seagle*s findings seem to in­
dicate that contractor negotiators are risk averters. They 
are willing to accept a lower profit with a greater sharing 
of the risk between the two parties. The sharing of risk be­
tween the government and the contractor is reflected by the 
type of contract used to support developmental programs.
^John P. Seagle, A Method for the Study of Risk 
Aversion from Incentive Contract Negotiations (Buffalo, New 




Types of Contracts 
The negotiations between the parties will eventually 
result in a contract to confirm the agreements which have 
been reached. The contract types available for this purpose 
range from the firm-fixed-price to the cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract.2 These two contract types represent the extremes 
of the contractual spectrum. Between the two poles are a 
variety of contract types that exhibit features of both.
Each will be examined relative to four characteristics:
(1) degree of risk-sharing, (2 ) profit opportunity, (3 ) cost 
estimate realism, and (4) control. This comparison is made 
in Table 3 . The comments in the Table are advantages and 
disadvantages from the perspective of the contractor.^ The 
contract types are divided into two groups: (1) fixed price,
and (2) cost reimbursement.^ Contractual instruments, such 
as time and materials contracts, letter contracts, basic 
agreements, and call procurement arrangements, though some­
times used in research and development, fall outside the pur­
view of this study.^
PArt, OP. cit.. p. 9 1 .
^Drake, op. cit.. pp. 132-13^.
li.Stekler, op. cit.. pp. 7 8-84.
Û.S., Department of the Air Force, Air University, 
Extension Course Institute, Contract Considerations, Vol. 3 , 
Course 6 5 0 0, Procurement Officer (Amarillo Air Force Base, 
Texas: Air Training Command, 1 April 1971), pp. 6 -8 .
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a. Cost-Reimbursement (CR) Contractor 
risk is 
minimized



























































Source: Hudson B. Drake, "Major DOD Procurements at War With Reality," Harvard
Business Review (January-February, 1970), pp. 132-13̂ -.
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The descriptive terms in Table 3 use the FFP con­
tract as a frame of reference. The firm-fixed-price (FFP), 
fixed-price-redeterminable (FPR), fixed-price-incentive-fee 
(FPIF), cost reimbursement (CR), cost-plus-incentive-fee 
(CPIF), and the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts will be 
considered in greater detail.
Firm-fixed-price contract.— The FFP contract is the 
most primitive of the contract types.^ A specific good or 
service is purchased for a fixed price. The negotiated price 
is a ceiling. Price is not to be adjusted. The price ceiling 
precludes this measure. This type of contract is suited for 
those cases where exact and firm specifications exist. Often 
in development the item purchased is a goal and not an ob­
ject.? The research and development program profile contains 
both exogenous and endogenous uncertainties. The FFP con­
tract makes little provision for the possible uncertainties 
from the standpoint of the contractor. The contractor risk 
is at a maximum. Accordingly, the potential for profit is 
high. The contractor, therefore, has a stimulus to exercise 
cost control. In general, regulations require that the FFP 
contract will be used unless another contract type is more
^Department of Defense, Proceedings of the 1967 DOD- 
Wide Procurement Pricing Conference (Hershey, Pennsylvania: 
Government Printing Office, 1 9 6 7), p. 98*
?Ibid.. p. 9 8 .
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appropriate.® In the past, public policy has preferred this 
contract.9 Specifically, the FFP contract is mainly appro­
priate where performance has been demonstrated and cost un­
certainties are deemed to be almost nonexistent.^^ (See 
Figure 11.) The sharing arrangement governs the method 
whereby the government and contractors agree to share costs. 
For example, under the FFP contract the ratio is 0/100 which 
means that the contractor bears 100 percent of the difference 
between actual and estimated cost; the government defrays 
none. The inverse relationship between profit and cost is 
shown in Figure 11. In the case of zero profit, a cost of
$220 is experienced. If a price of $220 was initially ne­
gotiated for the contract, this amount would include costs 
of $210 and profit of $10. However, a cost growth of $10 has 
occurred under the contract. The cost growth has essentially 
consumed the contractor's profit of $10. Under the FFP con­
tract the government does not share the cost growth.
Fixed-price-redeterminable contract.— The FPR con­
tract is seldom utilized by the government. Some individuals
®Stekler, op. cit.. p. 7 8.
^Logistics Management Institute, Briefings on De­
fense Procurement Policy and Weapon Systems Acquisition 
^Washington, D.C. : Logistics I-ianagement Institute, December,
1 9 6 9), p.
^^Department of Defense/National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, Incentive Contracting Guide (Washing­
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Fig. 11.— Sharing arrangement for FFP contract
Source; Department of Defense/National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Incentive Contracting Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October, 1969)j p. 2 3 .
have charged that it represents a form of the cost-plus-a- 
percentage-of-cost contract which is illegal under the terms 
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR).̂  ̂ The 
claim is that since the contract is subject to redetermina­
tion at periodic intervals the contractor is encouraged to 
incur unnecessary costs. The validity of such a charge for
11 S t e k l e r ,  o p . c i t . . p.  8 0 .
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a given contract would seemingly depend on the adequacy of 
cost visibility and control. Under this arrangement the 
contractor and the government share the program uncertain­
ties. This contract type is not used often.
Fixed-price-Incentive-fee contract.— The FPIF con­
tract with firm target is comprised of the target cost, 
target profit, target price, share arrangement, and price 
ceiling. Assuming that the terms listed in Table 4 are ne­
gotiated, a hypothetical situation may be examined.
TABLE h 
TERMS FOR A FPIF CONTRACT
Negotiated 
Contract Components Terms
Target Cost ............. $100,000
Target Profit ...........  10,000
Target Price..............  110,000
Price Ceiling ...........  120,000
Share Arrangement.........  50/50
In the event of a cost growth, the contract price will not 
exceed $120,000. Assuming a cost growth of $40,000, the 
government will share 50 percent of the cost increase. The 
target cost of $100,000 plus the government's share of the 
cost growth will bring the total program cost to $120,000 
which represents the price ceiling on the contract. The 
purpose of this contract is to provide the contractor with
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an incentive for reducing costs. The cost reductions are 
shared and the contractor's share is added to his profit.
The contractor's risk under this contract is less than under 










Fig. 12.— Sharing arrangement FPIF contract
Source: Department of Defense/National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Incentive Contracting Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
(October, 1969), P*
Cost reimbursement.— This contract type is suitable 
for those instances where the work is not sufficiently de­
fined, Research conducted by educational and other non­
profit institutions is usually supported by means of the 
cost contract. An estimated cost is negotiated. The cost 
is tentative as a consequence of the vague work statement.
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The final cost may be higher or lower than the negotiated
cost. The contractor is required by contractual provision
to give the government advance notice should a cost growth
be anticipated. The terms of the contract are very similar
to the terms of the CPFF contract except that all references
1 ?to a fee are inapplicable.
Cost-plus-incentive-fee contract.— This type of con­
tract is very similar to the CR type except that a fee is 
permitted. Consequently, CPIF contracts are used to support 
programs with commercial firms. The main features are a 
target cost, target fee, maximum fee, minimum fee, and the 
share ratio. The cost uncertainties are such that a FFP con­
tract is not appropriate, but are not so great as to justify 
the use of a CPFF contract.Three features distinguish 
the CPIF contract from the FPIF contract.First, the CPIF 
contract has no price ceiling. Allowable costs for a pro­
gram are governed by the ASPR, Section XV. Finally, under 
the CPIF contract the maximum fee permitted is fixed by the 
ASPR. The situation for the CPIF contract is illustrated by 
Figure 13. Profit in Figure 13 is at a maximum value to 
point A. If costs increase beyond this position, then profit
^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Sys­
tems Command, Air Force Research and Development Contracting 
Officer's Handbook. AFSCP 70-2 (Washington, D.C.: Andrews
Air Force Base, 30 June 1967)? p. k̂ -4.
^^Incentive Contracting Guide, op. cit., p. 3 3 .
^̂ Ibid., p. 3 3.
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decreases until point B, where it levels out. Therefore, 








Fig. 1 3.— Sharing arrangement for CPIF contract
Source: Department of Defense/National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Incentive Contracting Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October, 1969), p. 34.
Cost-Dlus-a-fixed-fee contract.— The CPFF contract 
is designed for use in research, exploratory development, 
and advanced development. In these areas of the spectrum, 
the level of contract effort is often unknown. A fee is al­
lowed to compensate the contractor for the risks borne. 
However, fee is generally lower than the one permitted under 
the other types of contracts. This situation accrues from
7^
the fact that the share ratio for the CPFF contract is 







Fig. 1̂ -.— Sharing arrangement for CPFF contract
Source: Department of Defense/National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Incentive Contracting Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October, 19o9), p. 38.
Fixed cost contract (FCC).— The FCC contract has 
been used on a limited basis. The contractual format is a 
mixture of the FFP and CR contracts.^^ The idea is to con­
tract on a fixed-price basis for those cost elements which 
are relatively certain and to use cost reimbursement
^Thomas E. Bahan, "Fixed Cost Contracts," NCMA News 
Letter Anthology. Vol. No. 1, 1968-1969-1970 (Inglewood, 
California: National Contract Management Association, June,
1970), p. 64.
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provisions for the uncertain elements. An estimated cost 
is negotiated. After the period of performance is completed, 
the cost reimbursement provisions are audited and a final 
price is determined.
Cost-plus-award-fee contract (CPAF).— The contract 
fits into the contractual spectrum between the CPFF and CPIF 
contract. DOD and NASA have used this type since 1962.^^
The key requirement is to determine the fee which will be 
paid at specific intervals. The fee awarded is based on the 
quality of the contractor's work. The determination is sub­
jective and can be appealed by the contractor. The CPAF 
contract components are a base fee, a maximum fee, provision 
for a variable award fee, estimated cost, and a fee payment 
plan.
Profit Considerations
In a free-enterprise economy, profit maximization is 
considered to be the goal of the individual firm. Profit is 
a payment to a factor of production and represents a reward 
for risk taking. This facet of profit is germane to govern­
ment contracting. Above average risk taking must be rewarded 
by above average profits. The relationship is a direct one. 
The profit motive is then the primary incentive for stimu­
lating contractors to exercise cost control.
For a FFP contract, profit is computed as follows:
^^I n c e n t iv e  C o n tr a c t in g  G u id e , op. c i t . .  p. 2k^.
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n A = P -
wherej|A stands for actual profits, P for contract price, 
and Ca for actual contract costs. The relationship between 
costs and profit is an inverse one. If Ca is reduced to a 
lower level, then profits will increase. If costs go out of . 
control, profit may be eliminated. A loss will be experi­
enced if Ca is greater than P.
The situation for incentive contracts is more com­
plex. The objective is to motivate the contractor to reduce 
costs by allowing him to share the actual savings. The con­
tractor's share of the savings is added to profit. An in­
centive contract model illustrates these relationships:
IIA “ II y + b (Cgi - Ca)
where ||a stands for actual profits, ||̂  for target profits, 
Cj for target costs, Ca for actual costs, and b is the con­
tractor's share of the s a v i n g s . 7̂ i f  no savings are experi­
enced, the last expression becomes zero, and actual profit 
is equal to target profit. Should actual costs exceed target 
costs then the formula indicates a reduction of profit. Let
E — Cj — Ca
then, when Cf]̂  Caj E is positive and if Ca ^C^ then E is 
negative. For the situation where Ca ^C^:
Frederick T.. Moore, "Incentive Contracts," in De­
fense Management, ed. by Stephen Enke (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 216.
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IIa  ^ M t ' ^
From this formulation, it would, seem that profits can only 
be increased by minimizing contract cost.
One factor influencing the size of realized profit, 
if costs are controlled, is b, the sharing r a t i o . I n  his 
study, Fisher assumes that the sharing ratio provides a meas­
ure of financial risk. As pointed out in Table 3» incentive 
contracts require the contractor to bear a larger degree of 
risk than would be necessary under a CPFF contract. How­
ever, with a high profit reward for cost control, the ex­
pectation is that incentive contracts might give a high per­
centage of underruns. Fisher's study revealed that CPFF con­
tracts had an average contract cost growth rate of 17*8 per­
cent, while all but one group of incentive contracts re­
flected underruns. An average underrun of 3*6 percent was 
computed for contracts with sharing rates between 0 . 1 5  and 
0.25* He questions the validity of the data since sole- 
source contractors can inflate target costs, creating a bias 
toward underruns. This bias results from the absence of 
competition. Essentially, no way exists to distinguish be­
tween the "bias effect" and the "incentive effect.
^^Irving N. Fisher, Cost Incentives and Contract 
Outcomes: An Empirical Analysis (Santa Monica, California;




For a FFP contract, profit has been defined as the 
difference between price and actual costs. Thus, profit is 
a residual, and from an accounting reference point, this 
statement is adequate. However, for efficient resource uti­
lization alternate uses must be at least acknowledged. The 
firm must produce those goods which maximize profits.
Highly-dispersed profit distributions in an industry reflect
onthe high level of risk present. In a study by Cootner and 
Holland, the hypothesis of a positive association between 
business risk and rate of return was tested. A linear 
model was developed, using data from 39 industries for the 
entire postwar period through I960. They found that a one 
percent increase in dispersion was coupled with an approxi­
mately one percent increase in average industry rate of re­
turn. Also, 30 percent of the variability of the industry 
rate of return was explained by the variation of individual 
firm rates of return. This variability of returns emphasizes 
the probability that losses, as well as profits, can occur. 
Should firms consistently take high risks and not be rewarded, 
then they will either exit the industry or go out of business.
^^Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, "Risk/ 
Return; U.S. Industry Pattern," Harvard Business Review, 
March-April, 1968, p. 91»
^^Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, "Rate of 
Return and Business Risk," The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science (Fall, 1970), pp. 214-21/.
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Numerous departures could result in a detrimental loss of 
productive capacity in individual technical areas.
The sole-source procurement abstracts from the com­
petitive environment. Price for a contract is a negotiated 
variable which, when permissible, will include a profit.
The ASPR for years required profit to be a subjective aggre­
gation based on a cursory evaluation of the effect of com­
petition, the degree of contractor risk, the complexity of 
the work contemplated, the extent of government cost as­
sistance, the contractor's past performance record, and the 
soundness of the individual cost estimates that were pro-
ppposed. A disparity developed between the theory and the 
working-level application of the instructions. As a result, 
profit is often historical in nature computed as a percent­
age of estimated contract costs.
Profit objectives.— For the government the profit 
policy objective is to provide the contractor with an oppor­
tunity to earn a fair and reasonable p r o f i t .^3 Fair and 
reasonable has meaning only within the framework of the en­
vironmental factors which exist for a given procurement. In 
the bilateral monopoly market arrangement, the exact price 
resulting from negotiations cannot be determined in advance.2^
^^Air Force Research and Development Contracting Of­
ficers' Handbook, o p . cit.. d p . 4-26.
^^incentive Contracting Guide, o p . cit.. p. 59»
^^H ibdon, o p . c i t . . pp . 2 6 7 - 2 6 9 .
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The price will be predicated on the skill and power of the 
participants and is indeterminant within certain limits. 
Profit for a developmental contract cannot reasonably be ex­
pected to conform to an average figure. The final figure 
must be based on an analysis of the unique combination of 
factors for the program being negotiated.
Weighted guidelines. — To enhance the attainment of 
the fair and reasonable goal a weighted-guidelines method 
for determining profit is used. The procedure is a fairly 
mechanical algorithm which is used to establish a profit 
goal. The application of some judgment is required. Fac­
tors, such as contractor's input to total performance, as­
sumption of uncertainty, and previous performance are in- 
eluded. The final negotiated amount may differ consider­
ably from the goal, as agreement on the underlying analytical 
details of applying the weighted guidelines is not manda­
tory.^^
Profit Patterns 
Assuming risk aversion on the part of the defense 
firm, the number willing to enter into a highly risky
^^Air Force Research and Development Contracting Of­
ficers* Handbook, o p . cit.. pp. 4-27.
26Stuart J, Evans, Harold J. Margulis, and Harry B. 
Yoshpe, Procurement (Washington, B.C.: Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, 1968), p. 1 1 8.
^^Air Force Research and Development Contracting Of­
ficers* Handbook, op. cit., pp. 4-27.
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industry would be small.Those that respond would do so 
in anticipation of being rewarded with a high rate of return.
Controversy has existed over the actual level and 
trend of profits for defense contractors. The Logistics 
Management Institute (LMI) in a study released in 1970 re­
ported that the contractors' average pre-tax profits were 
12.8 percent for defense work, 19*5 percent for nondefense 
durable-goods manufacturers, and 16.3 percent for commercial 
work by defense contractors.^^ The base for these percent­
ages was total sales. The report by LMI stated that over a 
ten-year period defense profits had consistently ranged below 
those of commercial durable-goods companies. Critics of this 
study insisted the results were unaudited and biased by the 
industry sample. A study by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) indicated profit averaged 6.5 percent measured as a 
percentage of sales, 2 8 . 3 percent as a return on total cap­
ital investment, and 56.1 percent as a return on equity cap- 
ital.^® The period covered by the GAO study was 1966 through 
1 9 6 9. A broader sampling by GAO cited the percentages as 
ranging from 3 . 9  to percent on sales, 10.2 to 1 ^ .7 on 
total capital invested, and 19.8 to 28.4 percent on equity 
capital investment. On the basis of profits as a percentage
28Hardy, on. cit.  ̂p. 40.
^^"Fuel for the Fires on Defense Profits," Business 
Week, April 11, 1970, p. 3 0 .
^®"The Profit Puzzle in Procurement," Business Week, 
March 6, 1971, p. 44.
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of sales, adjusted for methodology, the GAO results do not 
appear to differ significantly from the LMI findings.Re­
duced profits by defense firms have led to a flight of capi­
tal from the industry.3^ The significant factor is con­
sidered to be a government policy of shifting risk from the 
government to the industry without commensurate increases 
in negotiated profits. According to press releases during 
June, 1971 ; the profit rate on defense contracts is expected 
to increase.33
Profit Renegotiation3^
The purpose of this process is to eliminate "ex­
cessive profits." The Renegotiation Act is administered 
based on the contractor's profits for an entire fiscal year 
and not on an individual contract basis. The Act is en­
forced by the Renegotiation Board. The reviews are appli­
cable, if a contractor signs a contract subject to renego­
tiation, and his total business activity is in excess of one
31ibid., pp.
3̂ F. Trowbridge Vom Baur, "Shifting the Risk to Gov­
ernment Contractors and the Flight of Capital," NCMA News 
Letter Anthology. Vol. No. 1, 1968-1969-1970 IInglewood, 
California: National Contract Management Association, June,
1 9 7 0), p. 2 3 .
33"Defense Profits to Rise," The Norman (Okla.) 
Transcript. June 1, 1971» P« 3*
3\j.S., Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, 
U.S. Air Force, Procurement Law. AFM 110-9 (Washington,
D.C.: Special Activities Group, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, USAF, 31 December 1970), pp. 8-17 to 8-I8 .
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million dollars. The process is subjective and the decision 
of the Renegotiation Board is based on an evaluation of the 
facts surrounding each case.
CHAPTER VII 
THE COST GROWTH PROBLEM
The current term for a cost overrun is the one which
has been used in this study, namely, cost growth. The dif-
1ference in terms is related to timing and control. A cost 
overrun implies that contract funds have been expended, and 
therefore, the program did go out of control. From a tech­
nical frame of reference, cost growth covers this case, as 
well as the situation where unanticipated costs are en­
visioned for the future. In the latter case, however, the 
costs can be controlled through actions, such as program 
modification or curtailment. The term will be used to refer 
to those situations where a cost overage has been or will be 
experienced.
Costs for a FFP contract are equal to price minus 
profit. The relationship between program costs and profits 
is an inverse one, as program costs increase the profit de­
creases. Technically, a cost growth occurs when actual cost 
is greater than the initial estimate for a program. From
^"Defense Digest," Armed Forces Management, January,
1970J p • 17»
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the government's standpoint a cost growth cannot occur on a 
FFP contract, as the government has agreed to pay a firm- 
fixed amount. Thus, the expression has meaning only in the 
context of cost contracts. In actual practice, cost growths 
occur under various types of contracts, whether or not the 
contractor is reimbursed for additional costs.
Another misunderstanding that occurs relative to cost 
growths concerns the pertinent perspective.  ̂ Does a cost 
growth relate to one contract or a total weapon system? In­
dividual contracts support the preacquisition phases of re­
search, exploratory development, advanced development, and 
engineering development. A cost growth in one area may be 
balanced against a lower cost in another, so that the total 
is less than estimated. Thus, a cost growth may be accept­
able, the touchstone being the total-system standpoint.
The very nature of scientific exploration tends 
toward cost prediction errors. The initial estimates which 
are based on projections into the unknown future are subject
h.to considerable error. This condition accrues as related to
pW. E. Zisch, "Overruns Versus Increases in Systems 
Scope," Management Conference Seminar 5. Air Force Systems 
Command (Monterey, California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, 2-5 May 1962), p. 5-15-1.
^Harvard W. Pov/ell, "Overruns— Cause, Effect, and 
Cure," Management Conference Seminar 5. Air Force Systems 
Command (Monterey, California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, 2-5 May 1962), p. 5-1^-1• 
kBurton H. Klein, "Policy Issues in Military De­
velopment Programs," in Defense, Science, and Public Policy,
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performance, reliability, and cost of a system. Also the use 
of cost-type contracts contributes to the condition. The 
economic penalty for understating costs is nominal; there­
fore, contractors are motivated in this direction to obtain 
contractsOnce the contract is in existence, then addi­
tional funds are requested.
Cost growths are not the exclusive domain of the DOD. 
An early example occurred during the Roman era. In the con­
struction by Rome of an aqueduct for the town of Troas in 
Asia, the historian. Gibbon, observed that the final cost 
was more than double the original estimate.^ In the commer­
cial aircraft industry in 19^, the cost of an airplane 
scheduled for delivery in 19^6 was estimated to be $550,000. 
When the aircraft was delivered in ^^h6, the cost had in­
creased to $800,000.^ A cost overrun was incurred in the 
construction of the Rayburn Annex to the House Office Build­
ing.® Not much of the developmental work in the private
ed. by Edwin Mansfield (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 1968), p. 105»
Â. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, Predictability 
of the Costs. Time, and Suiccess of Development (Santa Monica, 
California: The RAND Corporation, October 14, 1959), P* 3»
®David Novick, Are Cost Overruns a Military-Industry- 
Complex Specialty? (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Cor­
poration, March, 1970), p. 2.
7Charles L. Dearing and Wilfred Owen, National 
Transportation Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings In-
stitution, 19̂ 9), p.204.
® N ovick , OP. c i t . ,  p .  3 .
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sector is placed on a cost-plus basis. This fact may ac­
count for the nominal commercial concern with cost growths.̂  
Also commercial developments seldom venture out of the domain 
of proven technology. Most programs relate to minor modifi­
cations to existing products.
Cost Growth Causation 
The causes of cost growths are best considered in a 
dual framework. (See Figure 8, page 51-) Prenegotiation 
planning prior to time tQ can structure the over-all con­
tract period, so that a cost growth will occur. The second 
category of causes is linked to the actions taken during the 
production period. The causes can logically be divided into 
those of a preactivation and activation nature. Preactiva­
tion refers to the time period between technical and cost 
proposal preparation and the time that the contract is signed 
by both parties. Activation refers to contract administra­
tion and closure. In Table 5j the causes of cost growths are 
listed under these two generic headings.
^Marshall and Meckling, op. cit.. p. 3 .
^Qlbid.. p. 2 .
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TABLE 5
CAUSES OF CONTRACT COST GROWTHS 
PREACTIVATION
1. Cost Estimation
a. Cursory cost analysis
b. Lack of competition
c. Projection and estimating process
d. Contractor underpricing
e. Variabilities in past cost data
2. Research and Development Specifications
a. Concurrency of research and development 
with production
b. Extraneous design requirements
c. Faulty technical planning
d. Inadequate task definition
e. Reliability problems
3. External Environmental Factors
a. Budgetary constraints
b. Corporate experience threshold
c. Uncertainty estimation
4. Internal Environmental Factors
a. Communication problems
b. Contract type selection
c. Risk analysis





b. Lack of economic penalty
c. Order reductions
2. Detailed Management Practices
a. Lack of cost control
b. Inadequate control of subcontracts
c. Changed reporting requirements
d. Excessive reporting requirements
3. General Management Practices
a. Changes in defense procurement policy
b. Lack of contractor corporate organization
c. Late delivery of government-furnished 
property
d. Inadequate management controls





The factors cited in Table 5 will be considered in 
sequence.
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Cursory cost analysis.^^— The volume of work often 
precludes an adequate evaluation of a cost proposal. Pricing 
personnel with limited experience contribute to this situa­
tion. When the price or cost analysis is performed by one 
activity for another, copies of negotiation summaries are 
often not sent to the pricing organization. Lack of feed­
back prevents a realistic appraisal of pricing practices.
Lack of competition.^̂ — The sole-source nature for 
the majority of research and development procurements re­
moves competition as a cost regulator. Secretary of Defense 
McNamara estimated that sole-source procurements cost at 
least twenty-five percent more than competitive ones.^^
Projection and estimating process. — Cost estimation 
may be based on actuals from past programs of a similar na­
ture. A percentage of the actual as a base is added to the 
old figure. The new total is the estimate. A better pro­
cedure is to use single or multiple regression analysis to 
develop a profile of past cost data. The regression equation 
serves as an aid for the prediction of future costs. The
 ̂̂ U.8., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Sys­
tems Command, A Summary of Lessons Learned from Air Force 
Management Surveys. AFSCP 375-2 (Washington, D.C.: Andrews
Air Force Base, 1 June 196]), p. 61.
^^William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 196^), p. I9Ü.
^^The Southwestern Legal Foundation, op. cit.. p. 207,
^ ^ S u th e r la n d ,  op. c i t . . pp. 13-15*
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assumption is that the future will have the variables inter­
acting in the same relationship.
Contractor underpricing.— According to one estimate, 
fifty percent of all cost growths are the result of faulty 
original cost estimates.^ ̂  The inaccurate estimates may be 
caused by defective engineering design, unexpected technical 
changes, incomplete cost data, and by purposely bidding 
low.^^ The latter process is referred to as a "buy in." 
Another form of "buy in," also referred to as "cost opti­
mism," is where a contractor bids low in an effort to con­
vince the contracting agency that a program’s costs are low
17enough to be funded. ' At a later date the firm reveals 
that the available funds will be inadequate.
18Variabilities in past cost data. — Past cost data 
may show variations in the prices paid for identical items. 
This dispersion may result from factors such as inflation, 
different lot sizes, and diverse cost bases for separate lo­
calities. Unless these variations are acknowledged, a cost 
growth may be built into the price negotiated for a system 
component.
15»Defense Digest," Armed Forces Management. 
January, 1970, p. 17*
^^Zisch, op. cit.. pp. 5-15-1 to 5-15-2 .
^^Stekler, op. cit.. p. 165.
18Sutherland, op. cit., p. 15.
92
Concurrency of research and development with pro­
duction.^^— The decision is made to produce a system or com­
ponent before sufficient testing has been undertaken. The 
feasibility of production has not been ascertained. The un­
known endogenous variables may cause difficult technical 
problems. These problems can increase program costs.
Extraneous design requirements.— The issue revolves
20around a functional design as opposed to an elaborate one.
A classic example of "gold-plating" involves a comparison of 
two turbine wheels from a nuclear weapon system. Part A was 
machined from stainless steel at a cost of $175» Part B was 
made of plastic at a cost of $2. Each part could do the 
necessary job. From the advanced development perspective, 
should a prototype incorporate modification to an existing 
system, or involve a more complex system which will perform 
somewhat better? In the latter case the uncertainties are 
more pronounced than in the former.
Faulty technical planning.— In evaluating the factors 
in the environment which relate to the requirement for more 
advanced weapons, a significant variable is overlooked. In 
other words, the wrong problem is solved. The research, ex­
ploratory development, advanced development, and engineering
^^ciaude Witze, "Challenge to Industry," Air Force 
and Space Digest. January, 1970, p. iM-.
^^Kaufmann, o p . c i t . .  pp . 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 .
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development phases are programmed. Before the weapon can 
be produced in quantity the specific application is obsolete. 
Plans must be revamped, and funds reprogrammed.
Inadequate task definition.— This facet refers to 
the detailed aspects of the planning for a specific con­
t r act.The work statement is written in vague and general 
terms. The contractor interprets the language and pursues a 
certain path of inquiry. A later analysis may disclose a 
divergence. The need is for definitive work statements and 
specifications, whenever possible. Confusion may exist in 
terms of unrealistic delivery schedules. The schedules can 
be met only by an increase in contract costs. Thus, a 
tradeoff is effected between time and cost.
ppReliability problems. — Reliable performance is the 
goal of most production hardware. At some point a model is 
fabricated. Operational conditions are simulated. Latent 
problems may appear in testing and are difficult to predict 
in advance. The process of reliability validation is an em­
pirical one. Experimental equipment components are developed 
and operationally tested until a breakdown occurs. The de­
fective part is examined and corrections made. The process 
continues until the results are acceptable. If acceptable
21zisch, op. cit.. p. 5-15-1* 
^^Klein, o p . cit.. pp. 9-10.
9^
performance is not attained, design modifications may have 
to be accomplished.
Budgetary constraints.— The planning-programming- 
budgeting process allocates funds to the various research 
and development organizations. Each one usually receives 
less than requested. Wanting to obtain as much coverage as 
possible, the activity may fund a program in a limited 
m a n n e r .^3 The contractor performs in anticipation of an 
expanded funding level. The extra funds possibly will not 
materialize. Thus a cost growth is incurred.
Corporate experience threshold.— A company with 
little or no experience in the defense industry has a tend­
ency to underestimate the uncertainty in government con­
tracting.This fact is reflected in cost estimates and 
delivery schedules which are overly optimistic. With no 
room for slippage, even minor problems can contribute to a 
cost overage.
Uncertainty estimation.— Exogenous uncertainties may 
be difficult to anticipate. Similar problems accrue to en­
dogenous ones. During procurement planning, each participant 
needs to perform a risk analysis. The objective is to
^Procurement and Finance Council, Risk Elements in 
Government Contracting (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Indus­
tries Association of America, Inc., October, 1970), pp. 22-
25*
oh.Zisch, OP. cit.. p. 5-15-3*
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identify external and internal uncertainties. Sometimes firms 
introduce new products based on experience with a similar 
established one. The similarities and differences are 
studied. The knowledge is used in introducing the new prod­
uct. An analagous process might be used in development.
Communication problems.— The lack of adequate feed­
back has hindered decision making on development programs.
Some program managers have not delegated sufficient authority 
to subordinates. This combination is mutually perpetuating 
and time consuming. Delays in obtaining information plus 
the time required to make a decision contribute to cost in­
creases.
Selection of contract type.— Scherer cites a study 
of 171 CPFF contracts that showed an average cost growth of 
18 percent.Another study revealed that two out of three 
CPFF contracts ended in a cost growth. CPFF and CR contracts 
usually contain a best-efforts clause which permits experi­
mentation as related to program direction and methodology. 
Also the fixed fee may be a weak incentive for cost control.
The negotiation process.— A practice in the defense 
industry has been the inflation of cost estimates. Two det­
rimental effects ensue: (1) No standard amount is added.
25ibid.. p. 5-15-3 -
2^Scherer, o p . cit.. pp. 15^-155»
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Negotiations sometimes reduce proposed program costs too 
much. In the bilateral monopoly relationship the contractor 
may be forced to accept unrealistic cost estimates. The im­
pact is to distort the final negotiated cost. (2) Not all 
firms add the cushion to their estimates. Consequently, an 
inexperienced company could agree to an underestimated con­
tract price. The basic concept behind this inflation of 
costs is that large initial demands improve the probability 
of negotiation success.
Inflation.— Increased costs for system components 
translate into higher costs for systems. Defense planners 
cite inflation as the paramount reason for the increasing
p Ocosts of weapon systems. For example, in World War II, an 
average fighter plane cost $5 0,0 0 0., as compared with $11.5 
million in 1971 « (See Table 6 for other comparisons.) For 
a research and development contract negotiated with no pro­
vision for inflation, actual costs may show a significant 
increase. On one Congressional list of 35 major-weapon sys­
tems with cost growths which totalled $19*9 billion, infla­
tion accounted for $3.1 billion or 1 5 *̂  percent of the 
total.29
27chester L. Karrass, The Nesotiating Game (New York: 
The World Publishing Company, 1970), p. l8.
28iiThe Real Problem— How to Cut Defense Billions," 
U.S. News & World Report. June 21, 1971, p. 32.
29»Defense Digest," Armed Forces Management.
January, 1970, p. 17*
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TABLE 6
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
(Millions of Dollars)
Item World War II 1971
Aircraft Carrier 55.00 7 5 0 . 0
Bomber 0 . 5 0 2 5 . 0
Destroyer 6 . 5 0 9 0 . 0
Submarine 5 . 0 0 1 7 0 . 0
Tank 0 . 0 7 0.6
Source: "The Real Problem-How to Cut Defense Billions,"
U.S. News & World Report (June 21, 1971), P* 32.
Lack of an economic penalty.— Stekler indicates that 
under cost-type contracts, contractors expend, not their own, 
but public f u n d s . A  fixed fee will be paid plus costs. 
Should the contractor for research and development control 
costs when the firm has idle capacity or should this ca­
pacity be used on the contract? If the facilities and 
personnel are used, then at least some of the charges will 
be reimbursed. Thus, an inducement to incur a cost growth. 
Further, a cost growth on one or several contracts does not 
seem to deter future awards to the delinquent contractor.
Order reductions.— Contractor prices for units often 
relate to the quantity produced for one single contract and
30gtekler, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
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not for the complete inhouse contract load.^l Consequently, 
when the procuring agency cancels a portion of an order, the 
unit costs for the remaining items may increase. In research 
and development contract funding, limitations may cause the 
curtailment of a program. If special tooling has been 
ordered which can only be used on a particular contract, a 
cost overage may develop.
Lack of cost control.— Some manufacturing firms do 
not know their transportation costs, yet believe they have 
these costs under control.32 This same condition prevails 
for some research and development programs. Costs are not 
kept individually for each contract. Costs are allocated to 
programs rather than being charged, based on recorded 
actuals. Essentially, no uniform cost accounting standards 
exist for the defense industry.33 Each firm prepares and 
maintains its own system.
Inadequate control of subcontracts.— Excess costs 
incurred on subcontracts are passed on to the prime con­
tractor and eventually the government. The prime contractor 
has the responsibility of monitoring subcontractor
3^"Taking the Defensive on High Arms Costs," Business 
Week, December 6 , 1969, p. 70.
3^Constantin, on. cit.. pp. 44-4^.
33Kenneth M. Jackson, "The Feasibility Study of Uni­
form Cost Accounting Standards," NCMA News Letter Anthology. 
Vol. No. 1, 1968-1969-1970 (Inglewood, California: National
Contract î-îanageraent Association, June, 1970), pp. 6 1-6 3 .
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performance. Some of the same problems are germane for sub­
contract cost growths, such as inadequate cost control, 
cursory price analysis, inexperienced subcontractors, and 
cost optimism.3^
Changed reporting requirements.— Frequent changes in 
reporting requirements may be disruptive. In some instances, 
contractors delay in making the changes. Significant infor­
mation concerning cost, technical problems, and delivery 
schedule deviations, is not received on a timely basis.
Thus, decisions are not made.
Excessive "reporting requirements.— Unless reporting 
requirements for a specific contract are coordinated, the 
contractor may be faced with duplicate demands. Management 
may not be aware of the existence or extent of the duplica­
tion nor its cost.^^ Too much information can hinder the 
decision process. This condition results from the inability 
of management to identify significant details or trends from 
the mass of available data.
Lack of timely information.— Reporting requirements 
may be optimal relative to changes and their magnitude. How­
ever, lacking timeliness, information may be of questionable 
value. Many management information systems provide a
Summary of Lessons Learned from Air Force Man­
agement Surveys, on. cit.. p. 65.
35lbid.. p. 29.
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complete report every thirty days. By the time these data are 
evaluated, five or six weeks will have elapsed. Variations 
from cost have occurred which can be hard to control.
Changes in defense procurement policy.— Reporting re­
quirement changes have been mentioned. The key is the re­
action of subordinate activities to guidance from higher 
levels of command. For example, the use of CPFF contracts is 
classic. In 1959, approximately 4o percent of all procure­
ment dollars were obligated under cost-reimbursement con­
tracts. By 1969, this percentage had fallen to 22 percent. 
This trend created concern in the defense industry. This 
reaction seemed to refute two principles gleaned from twenty- 
four years of contracting: (1) different programs require
the selection of different contract types, and (2) higher 
program risks require the application of a flexible step-by- 
step contracting approach.3?
Lack of contractor corporate structure.— Some firms 
do not have an organizational structure which will permit 
timely decisions.3® No one has the authority to make de­
cisions without the activation of higher approval echelons.
3^Logisties Management Institute, Briefings on De­
fense Procurement Policy and Weapon Systems Acquisition 
(Washington, B.C.: Logistics Management Institute, December,
1969), pp. 16-28.
3^Edgar E. Ulsaraer, "Mastering Technology," Air 
Force and Space Digest, September, 1970, p. 8l.
3^A Summary of Lessons Learned from Air Force Man­
agement Surveys, op. cit.. p. 75.
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The situation contributes to cost and delivery deviations. 
When problems occur, no one has the authority to take cor­
rective action.
Late delivery of government-furnished property.—
Some research and development contracts are predicated on the 
use of government special-test equipment. The provision 
allows the placement of the contract at a lower initial cost. 
Should the equipment not be available on schedule, this sit­
uation creates costly and time-consuming delays.
Inadequate management controls.— Management control 
depends on access by managerial personnel to adequate and 
timely feedback information. Insufficient data are as det­
rimental as excessive information. The manager must seek 
the balance between the cost of acquiring and maintaining 
informational efficacy, which is optimal.
Program stretch-outs.— Scherer cites five instances 
for which shortages of funds led to schedule slippages.39 
When no additional funds were available, a decision was made 
to stretch-out the program, to permit funds to be added at a 
later time. Thus, a tradeoff was effected between time and 
cost. The passage of time often attenuated the initial 
shortage of funds.
Technological obsolescence.— This variable relates 
to exogenous uncertainty. Technological factors lead to
39scherer, o p . cit.. pp . 5 9 - 6 0 .
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changes in a weapon's sophistication level. Such factors
llQcan make a developmental effort obsolete. Cancellation of 
the program will be more expensive, since sunk costs are 
lost. Program redirection will salvage some past costs. 
However, total costs will probably increase.
Engineering changes.— These changes relate to endog­
enous uncertainties. Problems develop as a program is being 
conducted. Testing can reveal defects, necessitating cor­
rections. A change in design may result from an initial 
U-1design error.' In any event, a change order is processed 
which may or may not increase the contract cost.
Program redirection.— Once a development program is
in progress, difficulties occur in trying to shift emphasis
U-Oor to abandon the basic concept underlying the endeavor. 
Changes generally are evolutionary or explosive in nature. 
For research and development programs this latter type is 
costly. Progress needs to be gradual and cumulative.
Drastic changes in basic concepts may require redirection or 
abandonment.
^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Sys­
tems Command, Management Conference Seminar 1 (Monterey, 
California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2-5 May 1962),
p . 1—11 — .
hiMendel Rivers, "Who is to Blame for Cost Over­
runs?" Government Executive. June, 1970, p. 192.
IlO
‘^ S ch erer , o p . c i t . ,  pp . 2 5 - 2 6 .
CHAPTER VIII 
EFFORTS TO CONTROL COST GROWTHS
Historically, the FFP contract has been deemed most 
desirable to procure supplies and services for the govern­
ment. Related to this preference was the emphasis placed on 
formal advertising.^ The basis for this public preference is 
competition and the moral obligation of the contractor to 
deliver the goods and services even when costs exceed the 
price ceiling. Advertised procurements supported by firm- 
fixed price contracts were the rule except during the period 
of a national emergency or exigency.
The post-World-V/ar-II era brought an unprecedented 
expansion of research and development. The advertised pro­
curement and fixed-price-contract combination did not serve 
well as supporting mechanisms for scientific programs. Edu­
cational and nonprofit institutions, as well as some commer­
cial firms, were ill equipped to absorb losses from cost 
growths under FFP contracts. The increased emphasis on re­
search and development, the increasing complexity of weapon
^Logistics Management Institute, op. cit.. p. 8 .
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systems, and the tendency for weapon specialization had a 
catalytic impact on the magnitude of the problem. A repre­
sentative sampling of the attempts to cope with this problem 
will be examined briefly. Also the effectiveness of the 
measures will be assessed. The measures to control cost 
growths will be considered under three headings: preacti­
vation, activation, and environmental patterns.
Preactivation
The decision to include a measure under a particular 
heading is somewhat arbitrary. The classes are interlinked 
and overlap. Each one was developed to stimulate activity 
for the minimization of cost growths. The primary device to 
control costs has been contract type. Prior to 1950, the 
FFP contract was the dominant one used. Emphasis then 
shifted to the use of cost-reimbursement contracts. On a 
procurement-dollar basis, 13 percent of the contracts were 
cost reimbursement in fiscal year 1951• This percentage had 
increased to ^3 by fiscal year I960. Reaction against cost 
growths under cost-reimbursement contracts caused the pro­
portion to decline to 21 percent by fiscal year 1966. A 
policy was initiated in 1961 to encourage the use of incen­
tive contracts. On the basis of contract awards, incentive 
contracts were l8 . 5 percent of the total in 1 9 5 9, but had 
increased to 27.8 percent by fiscal year 1965»^ The
2
F i s h e r ,  o p . c i t . .  p .  3 .
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fixed-price-incentive contract became the vehicle for pro­
curing highly advanced systems.^
The "Should Cost" concept was adopted by the U.S. 
Navy. The goal is the evaluation of a contractor's total 
production operation.^ "Should Cost" is particularly suited 
to sole-source contractors. The condition for application 
of "Should Cost" is when a contractor has ceased to be an 
efficient producer. The program contemplates a thorough 
investigation of a contractor's operation to identify inef­
ficiencies and then appropriate corrective action. The 
process reveals what costs ought to be, if the firm was an 
efficient producer. In one study the U.S. Army reduced a 
sole-source procurement with Raytheon by seventeen million 
dollars.^ The technique is relatively new and has not been 
used extensively.
In terms of design policy, the functional approach 
is now being emphasized. Weapon systems will be designed 
for minimum necessary performance.^ This change is directed 
toward "gold-plated" contracts.
Contractual provisions have been used for control 
purposes. Cost-reimbursement contracts have been
3Drake, op. cit.. p. 1 2 1.
'Should-Cost' Is the New V/eapons Test," Business 
Week, May 3 0 , 1970, p. 48.
^Ibid.
^"A Retreat from Gold-Plated Contracts," Business Week, July 11, 1970, p. 96.
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incorporating a "Limitation of Cost" clause. The clause re­
quires the contractor to notify the contracting officer when 
actual cost expenditures and commitments reach eighty-five 
percent of the estimated cost under the contract.? The con­
tractor incurs costs beyond the original estimate at his own 
risk and expense.
An effort to stimulate competition in defense con­
tracting was initiated by Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara. Increased competition was wanted to reduce costs 
and to keep them at a low level. In fiscal year 1961, 32.9
Opercent of procurement dollars were placed competitively 
In fiscal year 1969, the figure was 40 percent.^
Multi-year procurements were conceived with the goal 
of stimulating competition. A contract for one year often 
required contractors to purchase special-test equipment. A 
one-year amortization base precluded many contractors from 
taking part in the weapons acquisition process. This factor 
contributed to the preponderance of sole-source procurements. 
The multi-year procurement mechanism incorporated require­
ments into a program which spanned several years. Contrac­
tors could amortize initial costs over a longer period of
^The Southwestern Legal Foundation, Government Con­
tracts and Procurement (New York: Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1963), p. 8o.
®IMd., pp. 2 0 6-2 0 7.
^ L o g i s t i c s  Management I n s t i t u t e ,  o p . c i t . , pp.  2 6 -
2 7 .
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time. One-year contracts encountered uncertainty as related 
to extension of the program. Budgetary uncertainty was re­
duced by the multi-year procedure. The uncertainties which 
adhere to the cost estimation process, however, are increased 
with a longer projection period.^® Also the possibility of 
program cancellation is enhanced.
Another effort to reduce sole-source procurements 
was the establishment of formal source-selection pro­
cedures .̂  ̂ A point system was structured to remove subjec­
tivity from the source-selection process. The effort was 
directed mainly at major full-scale development and large 
production endeavors. However, when more than one source is 
available, the methodology can be used in all four of the 
weapons acquisition phases.
Component breakout relates to efforts to increase 
commercial participation in weapons development and produc­
tion. Instead of contracting for a major system or subsystem 
as an entity, the program is partitioned. Competition is 
stimulated and the defense-industry base is broadened. Firms 
are stimulated to specialize and practice market segmenta­
tion. However, this process increases production dependency 
and its innate uncertainties.
Procurement and Finance Council, Risk Elements in 
Government Contracting (Washington, B.C.: Aerospace Indus­
tries Association of America, Inc., October, 1970), p. 8.
11L o g i s t i c s  Management I n s t i t u t e ,  o p . c i t . . p .  2 1 .
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Two-step formal advertising was an attempt to inject 
negotiation characteristics into the advertising method. Its 
purpose was to promote the competitive element in contract 
awards.̂  ̂ In effect, the procedures combine the steps of 
both negotiation and formal advertising. The first sequen­
tial step involves technical competition in response to a 
request-for-proposal. The second step promotes price compe­
tition through the invitation-to-bid process. A study con­
ducted by the Air Force Eastern Test Range revealed that 2.7 
bidders participated in the award of 31 contracts.Thus, 
competition was enhanced. Unfortunately, effectiveness of 
cost control under the arrangement was not investigated.
Activation
In the activation category the administration of the 
contract is effected. Emphasis is placed on techniques to 
facilitate the management process. Production at the lowest 
possible cost commensurate with reliable quality must be the 
stated goal of the defense industry. In attaining these ob­
jectives the emphasis is on the activities of both govern­
mental and industrial managers to exercise effective sur­
veillance and control.
1 ?James Strieringer, "An Introduction to Two-Step 
Formal Advertising," NCMA News Letter Anthology. Vol. No. 1, 
1 9 6 8-1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 0 (Inglewood, California: National Contract
Management A s s o c i a t i o n ,  J u n e ,  1 9 7 0 ) ,  p .  4 7 .
13 l b i d . .  p. 48.
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In the past, a program manager has been assigned to 
major weapon systems. This position has included the respon­
sibility to manage all aspects of the system being developed, 
but not the authority to accomplish the contemplated goals.
A program manager needs experience, good judgment, stamina, 
and leadership capabilities.̂  ̂  Lack of authority to demon­
strate these qualities has led to an absence of effective 
program control. An awareness of the situation has stimu­
lated the top defense planners to delegate more authority to 
program managers. For example, on the B-1 bomber program, a 
recent decision was made to reduce program costs by elim­
inating some experimental testing. The decision was made by 
the program manager without a series of subsequent reviews 
being required.
Design changes have contributed to cost growths on 
development programs. Memy changes to a system or subsystem 
are made without considering the impact on cost.^7 Efforts 
to curb this activity require technical changes to be priced 
and written into the contract. Also a fixed-cost ceiling is 
placed on the program. This limit may require a technical
l̂ iippoject Bosses Get More Power," Business Week, 
March 20, 1971, P- 96.
 ̂̂ Lawrence A. Skantze, "The Art of the Program Man­
ager," Air Force and Space Digest. November, 1969, p. 81.
1A"Project Bosses Get More Power," Business Week, 
March 20, 1971, P- 101.
^^"A Retreat from Gold-Plated Contracts," Business 
Week, July 11, 1970, p. 97*
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change to be effected by means of a tradeoff. For example, 
fewer units can be purchased or increased costs can take 
place only if costs are curtailed in another area.
An approach with a definite goal of cost reduction 
through design changes was the Value Engineering Program.
The goal is to motivate the contractor to propose cost- 
reducing design changes. The efficacy of the program has 
been diminished by sporadic and resistant administration.
The people who evaluate the proposed changes are the original 
designers. To change seems to be an admission that the de­
signer was wrong in the first instance. The full potential 
of the program has not been realized.In response to the 
cost-growth problem, management information systems have pro­
liferated. ̂ 9 The objective was to obtain improved cost visi­
bility and control. However, the requirements imposed on 
contractors are costly and complex. For example, the Cost/ 
Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) has created greater 
risks and costs. These burdens include excessive paper docu­
mentation in response to a request-for-proposal, varying in­
terpretations of system requirements, and voluminous data 
demands. Instead of improved communication, the system has 
created confusion. Additionally, an effective coordination 
system does not exist. Contractors face an array of
g ^̂ Risk Elements in Government Contracting, op. cit., 
^̂ Ibid., pp. 44-46.
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information system demands imposed by numerous governmental 
agencies.
Governmental action was taken to improve the finan­
cial status of contractors during the production period. The 
goal was to augment working capital. Financial assistance
took the form of larger progress payments, expedited payments,
21and government loan assistance.
Finally, efforts have been expended to rate con­
tractor performance. A rating system has been used for re­
search and development contractors.^^ In general, these at­
tempts have placed emphasis on technical performance. Little 
or no concern has been directed to the cost-growth problem. 
The occurrence of a cost-growth did not appear to be a de­
terminant as related to subsequent awards.
Environmental Patterns 
Both preactivation and activation variables dealt 
with the cost-growth problem on a functional or procedural 
basis. The endeavors in this section relate mainly to con­
tractual philosophy.
20q. N. Virgil, "Is There a Proper Way to Control 
Government Reports?" NCMA News Letter Anthology. Vol. No. 1, 
1 9 6 8-1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 0 (Inglewood, California: National Contract
Management Association, June, 1970), p. 7 8 .
Logistics Management Institute, op. cit.. p. 2 3 .
22U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Sys­
tems Command, Air Force Laboratory Procurement Management. 
AFSCP 7 0-3 (Washington, D.C.: Andrews Air Force Base-
30 June 1 9 6 7), pp. 5 -1 8 to 5-1 9.
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The early 1960's brought centralization of decision
making to the weapons acquisition process.The military
services were separately organized but administered by the
Secretary of Defense. The objective was to eliminate dupli-
pU-cate weapon systems. The phrase, "commonality," meant 
that one system would be developed for all military depart­
ments .
By 1969; decentralization was being effected.
Most of the management decisions were to be made by the top
management officials of the military services. This pattern
established the atmosphere for the F-15 fighter program.
The impact of decentralization has been discussed in terms
of the program manager's role.
The program definition phase was an attempt to en-
PAhance design definition. The study procedure was to be 
regulated by competition. Two or more contractors would bid 
for the contracts. At least two contracts would be placed. 
The goal was to remove as much uncertainty as possible from 
the developmental endeavor. The emphasis would be on plan­
ning. Subsequently, a contract would be placed for the 
actual development of the weapon system. This phase has been
^^Logistics Management Institute, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
Anderson, op. cit.. p. 166.
^^"The Dogfight Over the F-15;" Business Week. 
December 20, 1969, p. 97.
26A r t ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  9 ^ - 9 6 .
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characterized by excessive documentation. The paperwork re­
quired to define the program often ranged between 20,000 to
50,000 pages.
An effort to obtain the benefits of price competition 
was the total package procurement (TPP). The concept en­
visioned the negotiation of a contract for the engineering 
development, production, and support phases of the weapons
p Oacquisition spectrum. The concept was applied to the F-111 
fighter and the C-5A transport aircraft programs.Both of 
these programs experienced significant cost growths. Most 
of the total package procurements were placed on a firm-fixed- 
price basis. The arrangement placed the burden for bearing 
the significant portion of the unanticipated exogenous and 
endogenous uncertainty on the contractor.^^
An Analysis of Effectiveness 
One measure of cost performance effectiveness for 
contractors is to compare the actual program costs with 
those estimated for the program initiallyThis procedure 
will reveal how effective past efforts have been in alleviat­
ing the cost-growth problem. If the occurrence of a cost
8.
Anderson, op. cit.. p. i66.
p O^Logistics Management Institute, op. cit.. p. 24. 
^^Anderson, op. cit.. p. 166.
^^Risk Elements in Government Contracting, op. cit., 
Stekler, op. cit.. p. 164.
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growth is assumed to constitute evidence that cost control is 
lacking, then cost control can be established as the touch­
stone. The minimal occurrence of cost growths would imply 
effective controls, while a pattern of cost-growth prevalence 
would imply the opposite. Three sample time periods will be 
sufficient to ascertain the existence of any pattern.
Peck and Scherer report that in a sample of 12 pro­
grams, developmental program cost estimates on the average 
resulted in actuals exceeding estimated costs by 220 per­
cent. Variances on initial contracts were much larger 
than on later ones. The sample programs included the B-$8 
strategic bomber, F-105 tactical fighter-bomber, Polaris In­
termediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), the Nike Ajax 
surface-to-air guided missile. The study was published in 
1962 and covered approximately the decade of the 1950’s. In 
the sample the cost-growth variance ranged from two to seven 
times original cost estimates.
In 1 9 6 9, a Congressional list of 35 major weapons 
system procurements revealed that 27 of the programs showed 
cost growths in the amount of 19*9 billion dollars.Indi­
vidual cost growths ranged from 8 million dollars for the 
Walleye II TV-guided glide bomb to 4,011 million dollars for
32peck and Scherer, op. cit.. p. 4l2. 
83peck and Scherer, op. cit.. p. 429» 
3^Witze, op. cit.. p. l4.
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the F-111 fighter. The greatest percentage increase was 
395 percent for the Navy's Mark ̂ 8 torpedo. ,
A news release in I^rch, 1971j quoted a General Ac­
counting Office report which cited cost growths totaling 
3 3 .̂  billion dollars.The Mark 48 torpedo program re­
flected a cost growth of 3 billion dollars for the largest 
increase. The Minuteman III at 2.9 billion was next. Data 
limitations do not permit the identification of the pro­
grams which were on both the 1970 and 1971 lists. However, 
the programs must have been approximately the same ones.
The increase in one year was from 19*9 to 33.4 billion dol­
lars. Over the twenty-year period measures to reduce cost 
growths have apparently not been too effective.
Summary
The situation can be succinctly described as the ap­
plication of measures to treat the symptoms of the disease on 
an individual basis. Yet, no measure has been fruitful in 
terms of coping with cost growths by identifying and working 
with the basic cause of the disease.
The Aerospace Industries Association in a series of 
reports has directed its attention to the uncertainty pa­
rameter. Their reports examine this difficult variable and 
its treatment by the government. The Logistics Management 
Institute reports numerous studies which may impact on the
^^"Weapons Cost Overruns Revealed," The Daily 
Oklahoman. March 19, 1971, p. 3.
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DOD-Contractor relationship.36 The studies may be summarized 
as follows :
(1) Efforts to validate and expand the data base for 
cost estimates,
(2) Improved mathematical and statistical estimating 
techniques, and
(3) Endeavors to increase the visibility of con­
tractor operations.
In October, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
issued a memorandum to the military departments. This docu­
ment emphasized the role of judgment in the weapons acqui­
sition p r o c e s s .37 The information disseminated to Air Force 
Commands emphasized the approach to be taken toward the 
treatment of technical risk by the government.3^
^Logistics Management Institute, DOD-Contractor 
Relationship— Preliminary Review (Washington, D.C.:
Logistics Management Institute, March 19» 1970), p. 10.
37pavid Packard, Memorandum for Subordinate Echelons; 
Reduction of Procurement Directives (Washington, D.C.; The 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 3, 1970), pp. 1-2.
3^David Packard, Memorandum for Subordinate Echelons: 
Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition 
(Washington, D.C.; The Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 28, 
1970), pp. 1-6.
CHAPTER IX 
A CONCEPTUAL COST MODEL
Four parameters and their interactions emerge as the 
key conceptual issues. The parameters are time, uncertainty, 
information, and cost. An inverse relationship exists be­
tween information and uncertainty. The significant char­
acteristic of the information variable is content and not 
necessarily its magnitude. The more information a given data 
element can supply, the more efficacious a certain management 
information system. As the informational efficacy decreases, 
the uncertainty in a specific situation increases. Increased 
information reduces uncertainty. For a definite time frame 
additional information can be obtained at an incremental 
cost. Also as time passes, information in the environment of 
the decision maker increases. Its amount and content can be 
magnified by the expenditure of funds. Program costs will 
increase directly with increases in uncertainty. The more 
uncertain the future, the less information available for 
decision-making purposes. The more uncertain the future 
events, the more costs can be expected to vary relative to
117
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initial estimates. If the immediate environment of the de­
cision maker is represented by a closed system, then it can 
be treated as a component in a communication channel.
Communication Factors 
In The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Shannon 
posits a model of a general communication system.^ (See 





Fig. 15*— General communication system
Source: Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication (Urbana, Illinois: The
University of Illinois Press, 19^9)> p. 5«
transmission. The message is encoded and transmitted, as an 
electrical signal. During transmission the message can be
1Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathe­
matical Theory of Communication (Urbana, Illinois: The
Uniyersity of Illinois Press, 19̂ 9), p. 5.
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distorted by noise. The noise consists of static or any 
other unwanted addition which tends to modify the signal. The 
receiver translates the signal into a message for evaluation 
by the destination. Although this model was developed by 
Shannon primarily for telegraph and telephone systems theory, 
it can be adapted to represent a management information 
system. An examination of Figure 16 reveals the necessary 
changes. The perspective is different. The decision maker 
is the receiver, and the emphasis is on the message which is 













Fig. 16.— Contract administration system
The decision maker represents the initial stages of 
the contract-life cycle, ranging from submission of the con­
tractor's proposal to contract finalization. The activity 
node consists of contract administration and closure.
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Environmental sensors obtain feedback relative to the status 
of contract cost and other germane variables. The data re­
turning to the computer can be distorted or inadequate. Its 
informational value is affected by the noise in the system. 
The decision maker and his immediate environment are a closed 
system and a subsystem of the over-all system. Four im­
portant characteristics of the process require elaboration.
Information.— As stated, information is difficult to 
define. In communications theory, the problem is compounded. 
This fact results from Shannon's definition of information.
In communication theory, information relates to the number of 
choices available to the decision maker, or to the number of
ppossible events which could occur. More specifically, the 
amount of information is measured by the logarithm of the 
number of available choices. However, as Weaver asserts, 
information in communication theory does not encompass mean­
ing.^ The conclusion results from Shannon's emphasis on the 
technical aspects of sending the message in signal form. In 
this study, informational content is critical. The validity 
of decisions made will stem directly from the efficacy of 
the data content. Therefore, a distinction must be made be­
tween information and its content or meaning. The term, in­
formational efficacy, will be adopted to refer to content or
2Shannon and Weaver, op. cit.. pp. 100-101. 
^Ibid., p. 99»
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meaning, whereas, information will be a measure of the amount 
of data. In essence. Shannon's definition will be observed.
Entropy.— The expression has been defined as a meas­
ure of disorder in a closed system. This definition needs 
to be refined. Entropy is a measure of the amount of in­
formation in a system; in particular, it encompasses the 
number of choices available to the decision maker.^ Entropy 
relates to the degree of randomness of the information, not 
to informational efficacy. As entropy increases, informa­
tion increases, uncertainty increases, freedom of choice in­
creases, but the informational efficacy decreases as related 
to a specific data source. In accordance with the second 
law of thermodynamics, the tendency is for the entropy in a 
system to always increase.^ Order in the system equates to 
informational efficacy. Disorder is measured by entropy. 
Increased entropy degrades informational efficacy. Let H 
represent entropy and IE represent informational efficacy, 
then:
H + IE = 1 and 
IE = 1 - H.
From the definition of information and its relationship to 
entropy:̂
^Ibid., p. 1 0 3.
^Shannon and Weaver, op. cit.. p. 1 0 3. 
^Shannon and Weaver, op. cit.. p. 1 0 5.
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H = - [pi log p>| + P2 log P2 + + Pn log Pn̂
*00
p(x) log p(x) dx/CO00
XX
= P i  log P i
1=0
where p^, p2 > .., Pn stand for the individual probabilities
of choice. In a closed system the tendency is for entropy 
to increase. A source of negative entropy is necessary to 
counter this tendency.7 In other words, the informational 
efficacy of the data in the system needs to be augmented.
As negentropy increases, the entropy in the system decreases. 
Thus, the feedback system has as its purpose to provide a 
source of negentropy.
The measurement of entropy.— Probability refers to 
the possibility that a specific or unique data element will 
appear. The occurrence of a given data element is con­
sidered an event, for example, a certain cost. The relation­
ship between total uncertainty and entropy is a direct one. 
The reference is to both anticipated exogenous and endogenous 
uncertainty and to unanticipated exogenous and endogenous un­
certainty. As the entropy or number of choices increases, 
the total uncertainty in the situation increases. As men­
tioned, the amount of uncertainty for any individual event
7 w i l s o n  and W i l s o n ,  o p .  c i t . .  p .  257*
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can be measured by its probability of occurrence. This 
factor permits the entropy for a probability distribution to 
be measured. The probability distribution is derived sub­
jectively, based on intuition and judgment. Consider the 
situation of Table 7 . The entropy for the probability dis­
tribution can be calculated.® (See Table 8 .) The entropy 
for the distribution is equal to .̂ $82. The probability dis­
tribution in Table 8 is platykurtic. The entropy will be 
highest when events are most nearly equally probable. When 
an event becomes much more probable than the others in the 
distribution, the entropy decreases. (See Table 9») Thus, 
with the second probability distribution the entropy de­
creases from the .4̂ 82 value of Table 8 to a value of .IO8 7. 
Possible entropy values will range from zero where no en­
tropy is present and probability of occurrence is unity to a 
value of one for entropy and the probability is equal to 
zero. Thus, information is measured by entropy which is a 
measure of disorder. Informational efficacy is order and is 
measured by negentropy.
Economic cost.— In a perfectly competitive market, 
a necessary condition is that each buyer and seller must have 
complete information or certainty about prices and the avail­
ability of alternative goods.^ In recognition of the
oSchmitt, OP. cit.. p. 168. 




Cost Estimate Probability Expected Value
$400 .4 $160
600 .4 240
8 50 .2 170
1.0 $5 70
TABLE 8
ENTROPY COMPUTATION NUMBER 1
Probability -p log p^®
.40  1592
.40 . . . . . . .  .1592
.20  1398
1.00 H = .4582
TABLE 9 
ENTROPY C0I4PUTATI0N NUMBER 2 




1.00 H = .108?
lOgchmitt, OP. cit.. p. 3 6 9.
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semantic problem in communication theory, information about 
the market is synonomous with informational efficacy. Thus, 
with complete informational efficacy, no cost estimate will 
ever deviate from the original value. In this context, eco­
nomic cost includes profit as a payment for a factor of pro­
duction. This payment is to the owners who are residual 
claimants of the revenue of a company.
Model Formulation
The foundations have been established for a macro­
scopic model which depicts contract cost theory. The as­
sumptions of the model can be summarized as follows:
(1) The theory is normative rather than descriptive.
(2) The effective cost for a program can be repre­
sented by the ratio of target costs to the informational ef­
ficacy of the data in a closed decision-making system.
(3) Perfectly competitive markets exist. Contracts 
are let on a competitively negotiated basis. This assumption 
will be relaxed subsequently.
(4) Entropy is a measure of the information or dis­
order in a system; whereas, negentropy is a measure of the 
order in a system and can be equated with informational ef­
ficacy.
(5) The informational efficacy varies inversely 
with the number of choices or possible events which can occur
I^Hibdon, o n .  c i t . .  p .  355*
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as related to the decision-making system. If one course of 
action seems almost certain, then the informational efficacy 
is increased and vice versa.
(6 ) Since contract price usually includes an amount 
for profit, this fact must be considered. Economic cost in­
cludes the profit factor and can, therefore, represent con­
tract price.
(7) No limitations on funding exist. Programs can 
be fully funded in anticipation of a possible cost growth.
The model stresses the relationship between contract 
cost and the informational efficacy of the system. Let this 
relationship be expressed by the expression:
Ce = IE
where Cg stands for the expected economic cost of the pro­
gram, C% for the initial expected economic cost, and IE 
represents informational efficacy.
Informational efficacy is equal to unity minus en­
tropy, thus the formula may be restated.
Under the assumption of perfect competition where certainty 
prevails, H is equal to zero and thus, C% divided by unity 
gives Cj and Ce is equal to Cj. This outcome for the con­
ceptual model verifies the assertion that under conditions 
of certainty no cost estimate will be in error.
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However, in Chapter IV the relationship between the 
government and the contractor was described as that of bi­
lateral monopoly. In Chapter II the statement was made that 
in fiscal year 1 9 6 9, 73 percent of the total procurement 
actions were placed on a sole-source basis. This occurrence 
seemed to validate the monopoly relationship. The impact on 
the model is the introduction of uncertainty which derives 
from the condition of imperfect informational efficacy. The 
change of assumption from a perfect to an imperfect-market 
structure allows IE to be not just one, but a range of 
values for each specific cost estimate. In Table 10 IE is 
assigned a range of values for an expected cost of $5 7 0*
This figure is taken from Table 7 . These values are plotted 
in Figure 1 7. The curve R illustrates the postulated rela­
tionships. As the informational efficacy increases, program 
costs decrease. The curve shows that the relevant range of 
IE values for decision-making purposes is from approximately 
zero to approximately unity. The curve R is asymptotic to 
both the ordinate and abscissa axes. However, outside of the 
relevant range from zero to unity, changes in informational 
efficacy have very little impact on cost.
Increases in entropy reduce the IE value. These 
changes in entropy technically result for a program from 
noise. In the systems context, noise results from factors 
such as cursory cost analysis, contractor underpricing, ex­
traneous design requirements, technical changes, and
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TABLE 10
EXPECTED COST FOR IMPERFECT MARKETS
IE ^E IE ce IE Cg IE Cg
0 00 .7 10 57 570 1.00
.2 2850 .9 633 57 10 900 •63
.5 1l4o 1.0 570 100 5.70 1000 .57
Cost
570
.8.6.2 •3.1 .9 1 .0
Informational Efficacy 
Fig. 1 7.— Cost-informational efficacy pattern
inadequate task definition. Assuming the existence of the 








If in fact the program was negotiated at a cost of 
$570, a cost growth of $482 could occur. The change would 
reflect an 85 percent increase in estimated cost. The prob­
ability distribution in Table 9 is more leptokurtic in 
shape. The .95 value reflects a high degree of belief in 
the one estimate. On this basis, Cg would be $639' The 
value would reflect an increase in costs of 12 percent.
Technical changes were considered to be the prime 
cause of cost growths.̂  ̂ The model deals with this causative 
variable in terms of the uncertainty factor in the denomi­
nator. The next factor contributing to cost growths was 
inflation. This economic variable can be incorporated into 
the model in the numerator.̂  ̂ Assume that inflation is 
represented by the symbol rho, p, then
CxP
If inflation of 5 percent per year is anticipated, 
then the expected cost value can be calculated. A two-year 
program is assumed. The entropy value is .IO8 7 . A compound 
interest factor can be substituted for the inflation
1P"Defense Digest," Armed Forces Management.
January, 1970, p. 1 7.
James C. Van Horne, "A Note on Biases in Capital 
Budgeting Introduced by Inflation," Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis. VI (January, 1971), p. 656.
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Thus, under the postulated conditions, the program cost 
would be increased to $y4o for the total two-year period.
The amount would absorb the impact of inflation and technical 
changes. Possible constraints by both parties to prevent a 
cost growth based on technical changes are ignored.
The Cost of Informational Efficacy 
The relationship of informational efficacy and pro­
gram cost is illustrated in Figure 17, page 128. As the 
level of informational efficacy increases, the costs for the 
developmental program decrease. Ostensibly, the logical 
approach is to continuously expand informational efficacy.
In this manner, program costs can be reduced to a nominal 
amount. Costs will not fall to zero, since the curve is 
asymptotic to the abscissa. This course of action would be 
optimal if informational efficacy was a free good. However,
Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial 
Finance (3rd ed.: New York: Holt, Hinehard, and Winston,
1 9 6 9), p. 816.
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the upgrading and maintenance of informational content have à 
definite cost. The management information system has fixed 
costs which accrue from the system's existence. The com­
puter must be energized, air conditioned, and maintained. 
Personnel salaries are relatively fixed, regardless of the 
state of the information in the system. The variable costs 
for the system have two primary components. Up to some 
point, additional amounts of information are needed; and 
secondly, the informational efficacy of the information units 
needs to be increased and maintained. On the basis of his­
torical cost relationships, the assumption can be made that 
the total cost of acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting 
the information can be expressed by the equation:
= aebt
where stands for the total cost of informational efficacy; 
a for the fixed costs of the system, e for the expression 
(1 + h)^/^, b for the growth rate, and t for the time vari­
able. The symbol e is the base of the natural logarithms.^^ 
The formula is an exponential function which exhibits growth 
over time.̂  ̂ The assumption can be made that a multiple re­
gression analysis has been performed, using historical cost
^^Jean E. Draper and Jane S. Klingman, Mathematical 
Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 105*
^^Sherman K. Stein, Calculus for the Natural and 
Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968),
pp. 109-112.
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data for the informational system under consideration.̂  ̂
The result is a $5^2 value for a, .5 for h, 2.718 for e, and 
t can assume theoretically a range of values from zero to 
infinity. For these values, the cost of informational ef­
ficacy can he computed for a given system configuration.
(See Table 11.)
TABLE 11 
COST OF INFORMATIONAL EFFICACY
t Ca t Ca
0 $542 2 $1,473
1 894 4 4,005
The data in Table 11 have been plotted in Figure l8. 
An examination of the curve in Figure l8 reveals that the 
cost for informational efficacy increases at an increasing 
rate. This cost is essentially the price of program admin­
istration.
Total Economic Cost 
Ideally, the total cost for the government is minimal 
for a specific program. Conceptually, the total cost is the 
cost of the developmental program plus the cost of program 
administration. The cost trends for the two components are
^^Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, Applied 
General Statistics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
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Fig. l8.— The cost of informational efficacy
divergent. For program administration, the cost relationship 
can he expressed by the formula:
= ae^^
The formula is the exponential growth function. The pat­
tern is for costs to increase at an increasing rate.
As derived for economic program cost, the relation­
ship is expressed by the formula:
_ ClCrr* —^ IE
When informational efficacy increases, program costs decrease, 
A decrease in informational efficacy is attended by an in­
crease in program costs. The relationship between informa­
tional efficacy and time is a direct one. Uncertainty is
13^
the connecting link. The resolution of uncertainty over time 
is accompanied by an increase in informational efficacy. The 
required conditions of the relationship can be approximated 
by the exponential decay function:
Cg = de~®^
where Cg stands for the economic program cost, d for the max­
imum expected economic program cost, e for the base of the 
natural logarithms, g for the decay rate, and t for the time 
variable.
Therefore, total economic cost can be expressed by 
the formula:
^TC "
where Cjc stands for total economic cost. Substitution in 
the formula for Ca and Ce transforms the equation:
CjQ = ae^t + de-gt
Differentiation of this function with respect to time will 
give the first derivative of the total economic cost:
= abe^^ - gde“̂ ^
o  ^
Setting the function equal to zero will give the minimal 
point for total economic cost:
abe^^ -  gde“St -  q
The solution under the conditions as posited is 2. The value 
can be checked by substituting the assumed numbers in the 
equation:
1 35
(5^2)(.5)(2.?18)^*^^^^^ - (»f,000)(.5)(2.7l8)’ *̂̂ ^̂ 2) =
(2 7 1 ) (2 . 718 )'’ -  (2 , 0 0 0 ) (2 . 7 1 8 )-^ =
(2 7 1)(2 .7 1 8) - (2 ,0 0 0)(.3 6 8) =
736 - 736 = 0
The numerical values for ê  and e”  ̂are from a Table of con­
stants.^®
The second partial derivative with respect to t can 
be computed;
d ^ c
If the total economic cost curve is at a minimum when t 
equals 2, then the second partial derivative will have a 
positive value. The result of this computation is a positive 
value. The selected economic program costs for several 
values of t have been listed in Table 12. The figures in 
Table 12 have been plotted in Figure 19 to give the economic- 
program-cost curve. Also the data in Table 11 for the 
informational-efficacy-cost curve have been plotted. Curve 
0 represents the cost curve for the total program cost. At 
t equals 2 the total cost curve is at a minimum. The mini­
mum point on curve C occurs at Y. Point X on the axis is 
the optimal cost. The minimal point also occurs at the 
point where the economic-program-cost curve, B, and the
®̂Kaj L. Nielsen, College Mathematics (New York: 
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1958), p. 2 7 9.
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informational-efficacy-cost curve, A, intersect, point D. 
Thus, for an anticipated level of negentropy the optimal 
over-all cost has been determined.
TABLE 12
ECONOMIC PROGRAM COST
t Ca t ca
0 $4,000 2 $1,480
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Fig. 19*— Total economic program cost
The Management Information System 
The conceptual cost model emphasizes the importance 
of the management information system to contract administra­
tion. Suboptimal decisions can occur, if the economic
137
program cost is considered in isolation. Rather, the total- 
cost approach is the touchstone. Only in this manner can 
optimal decisions be assured. The total-system approach 
dictates that total economic cost will be minimized. In 
this context, a cost growth may be warranted, if the over-all 
cost will be at a minimum. However, an impending cost 
growth must be detected before such a decision can be made.
The key role of the management information system is 
to provide proper cost visibility. The decision maker may 
have to alter his decision after the receipt of new informa­
tion, possessing a high degree of informational efficacy. 
Changes in the conditions surrounding the developmental pro­
gram will supply evidence of possible deviations. The in­
formation system must be designed and constructed to detect 
and report possible incipient disruptive factors. These in­
cipient variables must be defined, categorized, and their 
possible impact ascertained.^^ The identification of trends 
and patterns needs to be accentuated. For example, in Table 
5, page 8 8, engineering changes are listed as a cause of 
contractual cost growths. A pattern of increasing and dif­
fuse engineering changes should alert the program manager.
He must completely analyze the total program as related to 
the totality of the changes being made, and not just examine
D. DiSalvo, G. R. Hall, A. J. Harman, G. S. 
Levenson, R. L. Perry, G. K. Smith, and J. P. 8tucker, System 
Acquisition Experience (Santa Monica, California; The RAND 
Corporation, November, 1969), p. 3 9 .
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each one in a vacuum. A knowledge of the factors which have 
contributed to cost growths in the past will enable the de­
cision maker to recognize and detect program-change trends. 
Another need for the information system is the rapid de-
20livery of high-fidelity information to the decision maker.
As mentioned previously, some organizations require a de­
tailed management information report every thirty days. The 
delays involved can contribute to the magnification of prob­
lems. An undetected problem which has been expanding for 
five or six weeks may be difficult to control. Significant 
information must be timely and accurate. If performance 
ratings for personnel are predicated on certain workload
indicators, this condition can lead to falsification of sta-
? 1tistics to meet some arbitrarily established standard.
22The reporting system must enhance cost visibility. The 
visibility depends on an effective management information 
system abetted by frequent independent reviews and analyses. 
Visibility can be enhanced by engagement with the contrac­
tor, especially for large-dollar programs. The monitoring 
of programs may utilize management science techniques. For
20F. S. Timson, Technical Uncertainty. Expected Con­
tract Payoff, and Engineering Decisionmaking in a System 
Development Project (Santa Monica. California: The RAND
Corporation, August, 1970), p. 8 3 .
21David Halberstam, "The Programming of Robert 
McNamara," Harper's Magazine. February, 1971, p. 60.
22Edgar Ulsamer, "The Accent is on Flying," Air 
Force Magazine. June, 1971, pp. 26-27.
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example, the milestone approach might be adopted. The 
program would be divided into small manageable steps. Tech­
nical progress and cost control would be examined at peri­
odic intervals.
These needs emphasize the imperative nature of an 
effective management information system. Wiener,
Wofsey,^^ and Wendler,^^ discuss the requirements for an ef­
ficacious system. However, Schumacher does so in a more 
succinct and concise manner.His enumeration will be con­
sidered.
Anthropocentricism.— The system must be oriented to 
the user and the input agent, and not to a hardware compo­
nent, such as a central or peripheral computer. The inter­
face points between the computer and decision maker and the 
input agent and computer sensors should be the design focus. 
The facilitation of these interactions is the primary ob­
jective.
^^Wiener, op. cit.. pp. 11-1^.
ph.Marvin M. Wofsey, Management of Automatic Data 
Processing Systems (Washington, D.C.; Thompson Book Com- 
pany, 1 9 6 8), p. 7 6.
^^Clifford Wendler, "What Are the Earmarks of Ef­
fective Total Systems?" Systems and Procedures Journal. I7 
(July-August, 1 9 6 6), pp. 2 0-3 0 .
2 6 B. G. Schumacher, Computer Dynamics in Public Ad­
ministration (Washington, D.C.: Spartan Books, 1967),pp. 57-59.
l4o
Flexibility.— Environmental change is a constant 
occurrence. The system design must enhance detection and 
adaptability to change. If the system is automated, the com­
puter may be programmed to exhibit flexibility by the use of 
heuristics. Early detection of abnormal deviations is es­
sential .
Generality.— The system must be total in scope. The 
factor encompasses the requirement for integration and organi­
zation. Increasing complexity and disorder tend to degrade 
the system. Complexity can be a derivation of size. The 
larger the organization, and the more dispersed its parts, 
the greater is the diffusion of information in the environ­
ment. Bonner posits a direct relationship between size and 
complexity factors.Complexity involves a magnification 
of detail and a diffuse pattern of activity. For detail, 
the lowest common denominator must be identified. This ac­
tion will permit functional modularity in design. Func­
tional modularity allows the changing of the basic system 
components to meet specific needs as stimulated by change.
Simplicity.— Ideally, the system is tailored to its 
organizational environment. The total man-machine configu­
ration and the size of the user group are factors to consider,
2?John T. Bonner, "The Size of Life," Natural His­
tory. January, 1969, pp. 40-4$.
1̂ 1
Simplicity of design is necessary to avoid hysteresis loss of 
valid data.
Dynamic Model Aspects 
The assumption that organizational homeostasis is 
synonomous with the maintenance of the optimal total economic 
cost can be made. Then, the objective of a funds expendi­
ture for contracts and program administration is to keep the 
organization at the Lowest point on an aggregative total 
economic cost curve.
As indicated, the purpose of the conceptual cost 
model is to obtain a better understanding of the nature of 
the cost-growth process. The key concepts are those of en­
tropy and its relationship to uncertainty. The program-cost 
outcome depends on the subjective evaluation of the past and 
current environments and their projection into the future.
The derivation of a probability distribution will be af­
fected by the individual’s preference function as related to 
risk. The individual expresses his degree of confidence as 
to the future occurrence of some particular event or se-
poquence of events. ° The result at tg, for a given program, 
is an array of possible probability distributions. (See Fig­
ure 8, page 51») As Schumpeter asserts, analysis which deals 
with the relationships between variables for a given point in
p O A. J. Ayer, ’’Chance,” Scientific American. October, 
1965, p. Mf.
^h2
time is static.^9 The model can assume dynamic overtones, 
if past and future values of variables, lags, sequences, 
rates of change, cumulative magnitudes, and expectations are 
incorporated.
A computer program may be developed to simulate the 
contract administration process, as reflected by the con­
ceptual cost model. The parameters of time, cost, uncer­
tainty, entropy, and informational efficacy may be manipu­
lated to simulate various world states. An iterative routine 
would test each alternative economic cost for several proba­
bility distributions. 30 Basically, simulation permits the 
identification of successive states of the situation by the 
repetitive application of the rules that govern a system.31 
A knowledge of possible outcomes and the network structure 
of the variables which contribute to the outcomes will en­
hance the probability of problem detection and identification.
Dynamic programming can be effective in maintaining 
the homeostasis of the organization.3^ The programming of
Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 195̂ )) pp. 963-96M-.
3®David B. Hertz, "Risk Analysis in Capital Invest­
ment," Harvard Business Review. January-February, 196̂ , 
pp. 99-104.
31 Clifford Springer, Robert E. Herlihy, and Robert I. 
Beggs, Advanced Methods and Models (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 173.
3^Harold Sackman, Computers. System Science, and 
Evolving Society (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1 9 6 7),
p. 6O7 .
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the central computer which controls the management informa­
tion system is structured to permit the computer to react 
automatically to the occurrence of seemingly random cost 
deviations. Corrections are made, when possible, and the 
decision maker notified. The method is based on Bellman's 
Principle of Optimality.The process is sequential and 
its objective is to maintain the integrity of the predefined 
objective function of the system. In contract administra­
tion the goal is the minimization of the total economic 
cost for a developmental program. The totally automated in­
formation system does not yet exist. However, the incorpora­
tion of a dynamic algorithm in the information system to 
cybernetically adjust to all threatening environmental 
changes is utopian in concept, but is a worthwhile goal.
The Significance of the Model 
A mathematical function, such as y = x ,̂ is determi­
nant and certain. For a given value of x only one value of 
y can occur. For example, if x is equal to 2, then y is 
equal to 4. The conceptual cost model is not of this nature. 
The relevant variables are large in number, and the nexus is 
complex. Essentially, no magic number can be derived for 
the future cost of a program. The best estimate will still 
intrinsically incorporate an indeterminate measure of
33U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Management 
School, Operations Res earch/Sys terns Analysis Executive Course, 
GEN-1.2 (Fort Belvoir, Virginia; U.S. Army Management School, 
May, 1968), p. 9.
uncertainty. The value of the model relates to its explana­
tory capabilities. It illustrates the relationship between 
program cost and the disorder in a contract administration 
system.The purpose of the management information system 
is to essentially help alleviate this disorder condition. 
Increasing disorder will give increasing program costs. The 
disorder or noise is created by warp factors in the current 
and future environments. The objective is to better under­
stand cost growths and their causes. From a total system 
frame of reference, not all cost growths are detrimental.
In some cases, over-all welfare can be enhanced, if total 
economic cost is reduced. Informational efficacy is neces­
sary for optimal and effective decisions. However, addi­
tional increments of information are warranted, provided the 
marginal return is equal to, or exceeds, the marginal cost 
of increased informational efficacy. The inverse of a cost 
growth can occur. A cost underrun normally develops when 
costs are lowered by some technological breakthrough, so that 
production costs are reduced, or by the program not being 
conducted at the planned level.
In developing the model, simplicity was the guiding 
principle. Based on his experience, Einstein believed that 
nature was the realization of the simplest conceivable
oil.Myron Tribus and Edward C. MeIrvine, "Energy and 
Information." Scientific American. September, 1971, p- 179«
mathematical ideas.Complexity can obscure details and the 
true nature of a system. However, the simplest idea is 
basically a first approximation. A conceptual paradigm must 
be validated or refuted by empirical research.In the 
early decades of this century attempts were made by Hilbert, 
Russell, and other mathematicians, to create a system within 
which the whole of mathematical theory could be d e v e l o p e d .^7 
Four characteristics were stipulated: (1) no contradictions
could occur, (2) the system would be logically complete,
(3) its principles would be conceptually universal, and 
the system would be formal. However, in 1931j Kurt Godel 
demonstrated that such a system was unattainable. This theory 
stipulates that every system must fail in at least one of 
three ways which can be summarized as follows : (1) The sys­
tem will contain a basic contradiction, (2) Questions exist 
which the system can ask, but cannot answer, (3) The struc­
ture of the system will be too weak to comprehend the most 
elementary details. Thus, increasing complexity can cause 
degradation by factors, such as the incorporation of anom­
alies in the basic structure of the system, excessive
3^Martin Gardner, "Mathematical Games," Scientific 
American (August, 1969), pp. 118-119»
3^J, Fred Weston, The Scope and Methodology of 
Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), pp. 42-lf3.
A. S. Davis, Godel's Theorem (Norman, Oklahoma: 
Department of Mathematics, The University of Oklahoma,
1964), pp. 1-8.
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information in the data banks, the storage of incomplete in­
formation, and the creation of decision situations which 
have no basis in reality.
Testing the Assumptions of the Model 
The logical consistency of the assumptions which 
have been posited for the conceptual cost model can be 
checked by means of symbolic l o g i c . T h e  assumption is 
that entropy implies uncertainty, that information implies 
entropy, and these two statements imply information which 
implies uncertainty. Information is defined as the number 
of choices available to the decision maker, or the number of 
events which could occur. If entropy is increased under 
these assumptions, then information should increase, as well 
as uncertainty. Let c be entropy, a be uncertainty, and o 
be information, then is the statement,
[ (c-»a)-»(o-»c)]-#"(o-*a) true? The statement is examined in 
Table 13, where T equals true and F equals false. An exam­
ination of the final column in the Table reveals that the 
statement is true. Thus, the assumptions as outlined and 
related are logically consistent.
38john G. Kemeny, et al.. Finite Mathematics 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962),
pp. 1-1 8.
TABLE 13 
LOGIC TEST FOR ASSUMPTIONS
c 0 a (c-»a) (o-»c) [ (c-*a) /\(o-*o) ] (o-*a) [ (c-»a) /\ (o-*c) ] -» (o-»a)
T T T T T T T T
T T F F T F F T
T F T T T T T T
T F F F T F T T
F T T T F F T T
F T F T F F F T
F F T T F F T T
F F F T F F T T
CHAPTER X
COST UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
In Chapter IX, the emphasis was primarily on the 
over-all contract administration segment of the procurement 
life cycle. The following conceptual cost model was de­
veloped;
A value for Cj, the initial expected economic cost, was as­
sumed. This Chapter is concerned with the methodology for 
evaluation of C% estimates for developmental programs. At 
present, the process is referred to generally as cost anal­
ysis. It has been defined as a detailed analysis of the 
elements which are contained in a prospective contractor's 
cost proposal. In response to the need for a methodology to 
identify and control the risks associated with major de­
velopmental programs, risk analysis has evolved.^ Risk anal­
ysis can be defined as a scientific approach for the
^James L. Arnett, A Program of Instruction for Risk 
Analysis (Fort Lee, Virginia: School of Logistics Science,
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, undated), p. 1.
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1^9
evaluation of the uncertainty associated with a developmental 
program or system. The uncertainty may be related to cost, 
time, or performance goals. The cost analysis may be associ­
ated with systems or the individual programs which comprise 
systems. The emphasis is on cost analysis for individual 
contracts. In general, the principles espoused for one are 
applicable to the other. The preparation and evaluation of 
cost estimates to a degree is an art, rather than a science.^ 
However, management and financial science techniques may aid 
the decision maker in the process of orderly and logical 
thinking. Pardee asserts that the uncertainties which relate 
to cost, time, and performance cannot be accommodated by 
using traditional statistical and probability techniques.^ 
Insofar as the reference is to objectivistic or classical 
probability theory, the statement is valid. In classical 
probability theory, the concept of equally likely is 
stressed.^ For example, the probability of obtaining a tail 
on one flip of a fair coin would be equal to .5» This value 
is computed as a ratio of favorable cases to the total
2James D. McCullough, "Estimating Systems Costs," in 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, ed. by Thomas A. Goldman (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 69-89*
^Ibid., p. 7 0 *
IfF. S. Pardee, Guidelines in Accumulating Financial 
Data on Future Weapons (Santa Monica, California: The HAND
Corporation, May 27, I960), p. I3 .
^Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 196b), pp. 273-275.
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number of equally likely cases. In the example, one divided 
by two equals .5» Glennan insists that no amount of analysis 
can eliminate program uncertainties Again to a point the 
statement is substantive. The objective is to reduce uncer­
tainty, rather than its complete elimination. Instead of 
classical probability theory, Bayesian statistics will be 
used in this chapter. The theorems, of the probability cal­
culus will hold. The difference is subjective as opposed to 
objective probabilities. Consequently, actual results, after 
validation by time, will not always be in agreement with a 
priori probabilities. The focus in subsequent sections will 
be on the evaluation of Cj, the initial estimated economic 
cost.
Cost Element Estimation 
Proposals submitted by contractors usually include a 
technical program outline and a cost budget for activation of 
the effort. If the program is to be placed by multiple- 
source solicitation, the military agency can evaluate the 
technical proposal and its budget. In this way an independent 
cost estimate will be derived. The estimate may be used as 
the touchstone to measure the validity of the cost estimates 
submitted in response to the request-for-proposal. Should 
the program be sole source, the approach can still be used.
Thomas K. Glennan, Jr., An Economist Looks at R&D 
Management (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation,November, 19 6 3), p. if.
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The individual agency may evaluate the technical proposal 
without reference to the contractor's budget, and then de­
velop their independent estimate of what the program ought 
to cost. At this juncture, an assessment of the individual 
risks and uncertainties can be a c c o m p l i s h e d .? The possible 
extra costs which stem from the anticipated exogenous and 
endogenous, and the unanticipated exogenous and endogenous 
uncertainties would be incorporated into the estimating proc­
ess. Three primary techniques are used to develop cost 
estimates.®
Industrial engineering.— In this approach, the indi­
vidual elements are evaluated at a low level of detail. The 
elements are then aggregated to derive a total. Engineering 
standards for various operations are necessary. For ex­
ample, the item being costed might be the job of shaping 
basic metal stock, using a lathe, into a component part for 
an aircraft engine. The standard times are aggregated, and 
the total is costed to arrive at a cost estimate. The data 
necessary for this approach are usually not available to 
government personnel.9 Additionally, the process is
^Richard M. Anderson, "Handling Risk in Defense Con­
tracting ," HarvardLBusime^ July-August, 1969»
p. 92.
g
C. A. Batchelder, et al., An Introduction to Equip­
ment Cost Estimating (Santa Monica, California: The RAND
Corporation, December, 1969), pp. v-vi and 1-10.
^I b i d . , p.  7 .
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extremely time consiuning, and the estimates have been found 
to be less accurate than those formulated statistically.
Statistical approach.— The cost estimates are com­
puted, using estimating relationships for variables, such as 
weight, speed, and range. A decreased level of detail is 
involved. Instead of working with individual jobs to develop 
costs, the over-all category is used. For example, in the 
engineering approach, the various types of labor hours would 
be evaluated, then summed. For the statistical approach, the 
generic category labor hours is used. As in the previous 
approach, historical data serves as the basis for cost esti­
mates. In the statistical approach, regression coefficients 
are calculated and used to predict future estimates.
Analogy.— Estimating by analogy is a rather crude 
process. If system A originally cost $1,000, and system B 
is identical, except for contemplated cost increases of 10 
percent, then system B will cost $1,100. The analogy pro­
cedure requires the exercise of more judgment than the other 
techniques. The key is to determine how much the program 
under consideration resembles past programs.
For most situations, statistical procedures are pre­
ferred.^® This preference accrues primarily from the flexi­
bility and general applicability of the approach. Regression 
analysis, both single and multiple, is the main tool used.
^®I b i d . .  p .  7 .
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In terms of cost, historical data are examined to identify 
variables related to cost. The relationship may be tested 
for significance. For example, if cost is the dependent 
variable in a regression analysis for an aircraft, the rela­
tionship of weight and speed to cost might be examined. If 
speed is increased, what impact does this change have on 
cost? If a definite relationship is established, changes in 
the two independent variables will be associated with changes
in the dependent variable. However, the fact that the vari-
1 1ables are related does not imply causality.
A phenomenon which may be important in cost analysis 
is the 80-20 Rule.̂  ̂ The principle derives from the fact 
that a small percent of one variable accounts for a large 
percent of another one. Constantin reports studies where a 
small percentage of products account for a large percentage 
of company profits. 3̂ For example, 20 percent of the prod­
ucts in the product line could account for 80 percent of the 
profits for a firm. Should the company want to lower costs, 
it might be justified in eliminating one or more of the 
products that account for only 20 percent of profits. For 
government organizations, salaries and wages may be one of 
four or five budget categories. This 20-25 percent may
11lMd., p. 56.
^^Clifford H. Springer, Robert E. Herlihy, and 
Robert I. Beggs, Basic Mathematics (Homewood, Illinois : 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), P* 5̂*
^ 3 c o n s t a n t i n ,  o n . c i t . ,  p .  3 6 .
15^
account for over 90 percent of the total organizational ad­
ministrative cost. The principle has a wide range of appli­
cations. Patterns which fit the rule must be identified.
Such actions may aid in cost analysis.
In aggregating individual cost components, the law 
of large numbers is often applicable. This law implies that 
the deviations from the mean of component costs will average 
out. The single event defies prediction, whereas, the mass 
remains essentially the same or can be predicted within 
limits.The individual cost estimate is considered to be 
a sample from a larger population. Assuming normality and 
randomness, the inference is that the values will cluster 
around the universe mean in accordance with Chebycheff's 
Law.^^ The primary objective is to determine the total pro­
gram cost. Individual components may vary from estimates, 
but the total will not fluctuate drastically.
Commoner asserts that the properties which a complex
whole displays cannot be solely explained by the properties
1Aobserved in isolated parts. This paradoxical conclusion 
is referred to as the fallacy of composition. What is char­
acteristic of an individual cost element will not necessarily
^^Hardy, op. cit.. pp. 19-20.
^^Ayer, op. cit.. pp. 46-48.
^^Barry Commoner, Science and Survival (New York; 
The Viking Press, 1967), p. 43.
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be true for the whole.^7 The principle may be misleading in 
cost analysis. For example, a factor which degrades the ac­
curacy of the industrial engineering approach to cost esti­
mation, is that individual estimates are aggregated to deduce 
the whole.̂  &
Cost Uncertainty Analysis
Cost analysis and risk analysis have already been
defined. Arnett considers risk analysis to be essentially
1Qsystems analysis with the added feature of uncertainty. '
However,' in the cost area, Sutherland addresses the subject
20directly for a given program. His approach envisions un­
certainty being evaluated at the aggregate level. However, 
for a large system the cost analysis might be conducted at 
the next lower generic cost level, such as recurring and non­
recurring costs. Also, subdivisions, such as labor hours, 
materials and supplies, and equipment might be germane. He 
concludes that each aggregate cost estimate should include a 
section which evaluates cost uncertainties. Sutherland's ap­
proach will be adopted. The assumption is made that the cost 
estimates used in subsequent paragraphs are based on regres­
sion studies. Each estimate so derived will have been
^7paul A. Sarauelson, Economics (6th ed.; New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196*+), p. 11.
1R'Batchelder, op. cit.. p. 5»
^^Arnett, op. cit.. p. 4.
^ ^ S u th e r la n d ,  o p .  c i t . . pp . 7 - 8 .
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adjusted in an experiential manner based on an evaluation of 
qualitative factors associated with the regression study.
The selection of the economic program cost most likely to 
occur for a developmental program requires decisions to be 
made. Decision trees are graphic management-science tools 
which may aid contracting personnel in the decision-making 
process.
Decision trees.— Pending negotiations require the 
government manager to take action. He must decide whether or 
not to select a specific estimated economic program cost as 
his goal. Overt action is required. An act may be defined 
as a decision by the individual to take a definite course of 
action.22 if the assumption is made that A = set of
actions, then a decision is defined as the selection by the 
decision maker of one element from set A.^^ In cost analysis 
A represents the possible cost estimates which might be se­
lected for a given contract. An event may be defined as a
ph.subset of a sample space. Acts are under the control of
21 Norman V. Breckner and Joseph W. Noah, "Costing of 
Systems," in Defense Management, ed. by Stephen Enke 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967),
P- 55.
^^Robert Schlaifer, Probability and Statistics for 
Business Decisions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1959), pp. 3-24.
^^Hwang, OP. cit., p. 18 .
pUT. R. Dyckman, S. Smidt, and A. K. McAdams, Man­
agement Decision Making Under Uncertainty (London: The
MacMillan Company, 1969), p. 34.
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the individual; the possible outcomes or events are uncertain 
and beyond the decision maker's control. A process of 
change, where the decision maker is faced with more than one 
outcome, is uncertain and is called a stochastic or random 
process.The acts available to the manager can be illus­
trated by a decision tree.^^ This device is a graphical- 
sequential technique for portraying the act-event sequence.
A decision tree is diagrammed in Figure 20. An act would be 
to select either Program A or B. The event success would be 
applicable if the cost estimate was accurate or an underrun 
occurred, and no success would imply that a cost growth was 
the outcome.
Probability assignments.— The assumption can be made 
that historical cost data has been analyzed. This review 
shows that Program A has been selected with a frequency such 
that a . 5  probability is assigned. (See Chapter V, pages 53 
through 56.) The same probability is assigned to Program B. 
The probability of success when A was chosen has been ,7 and 
for B the figure is .5» In Figure 21, these probabilities 
have been added to the decision tree. The question arises, 
what is the unconditional probability of success for expected
^%wang, op. cit.. p. 1 8.
L. S. Hill, Management Planning and Control of Re­
search and Technology Projects (Santa Monica, California:
The RAND Corporation, June, 1966), p.
^^John F. Magee, "Decision Trees for Decision 










Fig. 20.— Decision tree for two programs
cost A? The question relates to the occurrence of joint 
events. For example, A occurs and so does success. The 
joint probability is (.5)(*3) = .15, plus (.$)(.4) = .20 for 
a total of .3 5 . Joint probabilities have been added to the 
decision tree in Figure 21. The unconditional probability 
of success is .25 + *35 = .60. The conditional decision 
tree with assigned probabilities is a very useful decision
p Otool and will be used again in a latter section.
Utility theory.— The concept envisions that a quan­
titative scale can be derived which describes an individual's 
preference for various degrees of r i s k . ^ 9  (ggg Chapter V,
p O
Clifford H. Springer, et al., Probabilistic Models 
^Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 196b), pp. 225-










Fig. 21.— Decision tree with assigned probabilities
pages 56 through 61.) Depending on the over-all shape of his 
utility function, an individual can be classified as a risk 
averter, risk seeker, or a risk ignorer. The utility func­
tion may aid in decision making.From the above illustra­
tion, the expected economic cost for Program A is $57,000. 
(See Table 2, page 5̂ .) For Program B, the expected eco­
nomic cost is $6 0 ,5 0 0., as computed in Table l4. Then 
Tables 2 and 1*+ show the situation prior to the application 
of utilities. Program A is superior to B, having ein ex­
pected economic cost of $57,000. The utility function for 
the agency (derived from an entire group of managers who
30j. R. Miller, III, A Systematic Procedure for 
Assessing the Worth of Complex Alternatives (Bedford. 
Massachusetts: The Mitre Corporation, November, 1967),pp. 2 8-2 9 .
160
have responded to a posited lottery) is assumed. The utility 
values are weighed by the probabilities as in Table 15* The 
expected utility value of 5*0 for Program B is higher than 
the 4.0 value for A. Thus, the choice is B, rather than A, 
when risk preference is considered.
TABLE 14 







7 0 ,0 0 0 .3 21,000
1.0 $60,500
TABLE 15
EXPECTED UTILITY VALUE (EUV)
Program A Program B
Utiles Probability EUV Utiles Probability EUV
8 .4 3.2 20 .4 8.0
6 .4 2.4 2 .3 .6
-8 .2 -1.6 -12 .3 -3.6
1.0 4.0 1.0 5.0
Application of Bayes' Theorem.— New information 
which reduces the degree of uncertainty will often lead to
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the revision of probabilities and permit the individual to 
modify his previous decision.In the situation diagrammed 
in Figure 21, the unconditional probability of success was 
computed as .60. Suppose information is received which dis­
closes that Program A will be selected, what is the proba­
bility of success, given this additional information? The 
probability can be computed using the following formula:
?o(Ai) P(x|Ai)
P(Ai I X) = 2. P (A.) PCX I A.)J o j 1 j
where the A^'s are a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
events, Pg(Â ) is the prior probability of Aĵ, X is the ob­
served event, and P(X I Aĵ) is the probability of the observed 
event given that A^ is true.^^ The formula is referred to as 
Bayes' Theorem. In reality, the formula is nothing more than 
the mathematical definition of conditional probability. 
Initially, prior probabilities that a given event will occur 
are stated, such as a striped ball being drawn from an urn 
with a probability of .5*̂  ̂ If a striped ball is drawn, the 
probability of red is .2. Thus, the joint probability of 
striped and red is .1 ; i.e., P(S,R) = (.5)(*2) = .1. The 
other balls in the urn are green-dotted, green-striped, and
 ̂John F. Magee, "How to Use Decision Trees in 
Capital Investment." Harvard Business Review. September- 
October, 1964, pp. 93-96.
^^Schmitt, OP. cit.. p. 65.
^ ^ S c h l a i f e r ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 1 6 0 - 1 6 9 .
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red-dotted. Thus, if a ball is drawn, and it is red, this 
event provides new information. This occurrence may be used 
to revise the prior probabilities by the application of the 
conditional probability and Bayes’ Formula;
P(S| R) = P(S.R) = _______P(S) P(R| S)________
P(R) P(S) P(R I S) + P(D) P(R| D)
Bayes’ Formula is applied to the urn example in Table 16.
The probability of a striped ball, given red is drawn, is 
sought. The new information that the ball which was drawn 
was red has permitted the probability of a striped ball to be 
revised from .6 (prior probability) to .33 (posterior proba­
bility) . For the two-program example from Figure 21, the 
methodology is applied in Table I7. The unconditional prob­
ability of a cost growth is .40. The new information that A 
has been selected changes the probability of a cost grcv.th 
from .4o to .375* Thus, the independent derivation of eco­
nomic program cost estimates may be used to compute the like­
lihood of a cost growth. Continuous screening of environ­
mental information is important. An evaluation of feedback 
data may reveal facts which permit the revision of initial 
probabilities. Efforts, such as those considered in this 
Chapter, may contribute to the reduction and resolution of 




Event P(E) P(R|E) P(E,R) P(E|R)
Striped Ball .6 .2 .12 .12/.35= .33
Dotted Ball .6 .24 .24/.36 = .67
1 .0 .36 1.00
TABLE 17




Event Joint Posterior 
P(Cost Growth) Prob. Prob.
A .5 •3 15 .375




In recent years much attention has been placed on 
the subject of cost growths. Uncertainties exist relative 
to program costs, delivery dates, and product reliability. 
Delivery schedules and reliability are directly related to 
costs. If a contractor is willing to expend unlimited funds, 
then the delivery schedule can be accomplished with the re­
quired degree of product quality. However, unlimited funds 
are not generally available. Thus, the need is for a con­
ceptual cost model to assist the government and its con­
tractors in coping with uncertainty parameters which could 
affect the costs of a sole-source, negotiated, developmental 
contract. The type of contract used to support a given pro­
gram is at present the primary technique used to cope with 
cost uncertainty.
Environmental changes require weapon systems be modi­
fied to conform to the current technological state-of-the- 
art. The process leading from an idea to a system component 
or system may be thought of as a constantly evolving
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spec trim. The continuum originates with the research stage 
and progresses through exploratory and advanced'development 
to engineering development. The nature of the spectrum is 
dynamic. New ideas have their genesis at each stage of the 
spectrum, so the continuum is constantly being expanded.
The research and development spectrum exists in an environ­
ment characterized by technological, cost, and other related 
uncertainties. The unknowns are greatest in the research 
stage, and decrease as a program passes across the spectrum.
A monopolistic market relationship results from the high in­
cidence of sole-source procurements. Thus, competition is 
not a stimulus which will regulate the formation of cost 
estimates. Instead, negotiations must attain the goal. 
Government procurements may be placed by either advertising 
or negotiation. Research and development programs seldom 
conform to the criteria for formal advertising. Thus, they 
are placed by means of negotiation.
The research and development continuum encompasses 
research, exploratory development, advanced development, and 
engineering development. With the addition of production and 
operational deployment, the total weapons acquisition process 
emerges. From a contractual standpoint, the weapon acquisi­
tion process can be segmented into four phases. These 
phases are concept formulation, contract definition, engi­
neering development, and production and operation. From a 
historical perspective, the weapons acquisition process
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evolved from a simplistic process effected in a simple en­
vironment to a complex procedure that has to be conducted in 
a highly-structured milieu. The military products evolved 
from general ones used by the majority to complex ones used 
only by a minority. The products are used in small quanti­
ties and must be manufactured by specialized firms. This 
factor gives rise to the need for the contractual relation­
ship. At each interface between a procurement phase, a con­
tract or contracts will be negotiated. Each contract will 
have a life cycle. The cycle is comprised of the steps, 
contractor proposal, requirement validation, procurement 
planning, contract negotiations, contract finalization, con­
tract administration, and contract closure. Concerning cost 
uncertainties, two aspects of the procurement cycle are of 
signal importance. Cost growths occur over time during con­
tract administration. However, factors considered when the 
contract was negotiated may cause cost variances. For pro­
curement planning, a distinction must be made between cost 
and price analysis. Cost analysis envisions a detailed anal­
ysis of the elements contained in a prospective contractor's 
cost proposal. Evidence supports the contention that an un­
warranted degree of confidence is placed in cost estimates. 
However, considering technical unknowns, and the possibility 
of environmental change, future cost variability is almost 
inevitable. The decision maker needs to insure that every 
effort will be made to reduce the cost uncertainties inher­
ent in a given research and development program.
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The structure of the defense industry has evolved 
based on implosive inputs of a political, social, and eco­
nomic nature. The defense industry is composed of those 
firms which sell products and services either directly or 
indirectly to the Department of Defense. Many political, 
social, and economic factors have had a deterministic impact 
on the structure of the industry and accrue from the rela­
tionship between the Department of Defense and its contrac­
tors. The large number of sole-source, negotiated procure­
ments would seem to validate a bilateral monopoly relation­
ship. Economic forces interact to create a relationship 
that sets the defense industry apart from the general busi­
ness community. Six basic interrelated factors comprise the 
economic forces: (1) absence of competition, (2) demand un­
certainty, (3) geographical concentration, (4) production 
dependence, (5) industrial specialization, and (6) external 
and internal uncertainty. The political and social elements 
relate to the legal restrictions placed on the industry by 
the legislative and the judicial branches of the government. 
In the final analysis, the industry characteristics result 
from the nature of uncertainties or from the efforts that 
are taken to cope with them.
From a simplistic frame of reference, uncertainty is 
the absence of information. The uncertainty spectrum ranges 
from certainty with complete knowledge through risk with in­
complete knowledge to uncertainty with the absence of
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knowledge. Uncertainty and risk can be treated as synonomous 
terms. Various terms have been used to categorize and de­
scribe the type of uncertainties which have been identified 
and observed. The terms may be classified into four tax­
onomic classes: environmental, functional, informational, and
technical. From these classes, a taxonomic definitional tree 
may be derived. In terras of the degree of knowledge present 
for a variable, uncertainties may be categorized as either 
anticipated or unanticipated. Each of these can be labelled 
relative to its origin. The terms, exogenous and endogenous 
were used. For example, unanticipated exogenous variables 
would be those external to the organization and unknown to 
the decision maker. In relation to the phases of the weapons 
acquisition process, uncertainty is resolved over time. As a 
scientific concept traverses the spectrum, information is 
gleaned from each stage which permits successful solution of 
the emergent problems. Information may be thought of as a 
commodity. In this sense, information may be described and 
measured. Information is the input commodity for a manage­
ment information system. It should possess the character­
istics of objectivity, validity, reliability, relevance, 
completeness, usefulness, organization, and recency. The 
degree of uncertainty present in a situation increases in 
direct proportion to the number of unknowns involved and the 
distance into the future of the contemplated events. Thus, 
uncertainty is a direct function of time. Change is a
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constant in the environment. Change is predicated on time. 
Fluidity and movement characterize time. The goal is the 
reduction and resolution of uncertainty over time. Uncer­
tainty can he eliminated either by taking definite action to 
reduce it or by transferring the risk to others. Thus, in 
the government-contracting relationship, uncertainty can be 
transferred to the contractor or the risk may be shared, and 
action taken by both parties to reduce its magnitude. Two 
measures of uncertainty can be used. First, probability can 
be used as a measure of uncertainty. Then, the probability 
distribution for a given random variable as related to the 
dispersion of values around the expected may be used to de­
rive probabilities that a certain value of the variable will 
occur. Studies have shown that individuals exhibit varying 
attitudes toward risk. Cardinal utility theory may be used 
to measure an individual's attitude toward risk. Three cate­
gories of individuals relative to risk preference have been 
identified and labelled as risk averters, risk seekers, and 
risk ignorers. Individual utility theory has its bases in 
economic theory and is finding limited acceptance. However, 
the concept of a group utility function has not found as 
many advocates. The reduction and resolution of uncertainty 
can be expensive. The question is how much time and re­
sources are the pertinent parties willing to pay for the re­
duction of uncertainty. As a rule, new information should 
be sought, so long as the marginal return exceeds, or is
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equal to, the marginal cost of the effort. As startling as 
it may seem, a cost growth for a specific contract may he 
less costly than the actions which would have to be taken to 
preclude its occurrence.
The military services have attempted to cope with 
uncertainty by the use of incentives and contractual arrange­
ments . Degree of risk bearing by contractors has been a key 
determinant of the profit allowed on an individual contract. 
Theoretically, the more uncertainty borne by the contractor, 
the larger the profit permitted. Tentative findings seem to 
indicate that contractor negotiators are risk averters.
They are willing to accept a lower profit with a greater 
sharing of the risk between the two parties. The sharing of 
risk between the government and the contractor is reflected 
by the type of contract used to support developmental pro­
grams. The contract types available for this purpose range 
from the firra-fixed-price contract to the cost-plus-fixed- 
fee one. The firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-redeterminable, 
fixed-price-incentive-fee, cost-reimbursement, cost-plus- 
incentive-fee, and the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract types 
were considered in some detail. The contractor bears the 
highest degree of risk under the fixed-price contract, and 
the lowest under the cost-plus-fixed-fee type. The fixed- 
price-redeterminable contract type is seldom used by the 
government. The claim is that since the contract is subject 
to redetermination at periodic intervals the contractor is
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encouraged to operate in an inefficient manner and to incur 
unnecessary costs. The validity of such a charge for a given 
contract would depend on the adequacy of cost visibility and 
control. If proper control can be maintained, this type of 
contract may be the answer for the support of high-dollar- 
developmental procurements. In a free-enterprise economy, 
profit maximization is considered to be the goal of the in­
dividual firm. Profits need to be related in direct propor­
tion to the magnitude of the risk borne. The profit incen­
tive as related to incentive contracts was examined. Data 
indicated that incentive contracts have not been overly ef­
fective in coping with the cost-growth problem. Highly- 
dispersed profit distributions in an industry reflect the 
high degree of risk. Should firms consistently take high 
risks and not be rewarded, then they will either exit the 
industry or go out of business. Numerous departures could 
result in a detrimental loss of productive capacity in indi­
vidual technical areas. For the government, the profit 
policy objective is to provide the contractor with an oppor­
tunity to earn a fair and reasonable profit. Fair and rea­
sonable has meaning within the framework of the environ­
mental factors for a given procurement. No reason exists to 
expect the profit for an advanced development contract to 
conform to an average figure. The final figure must be based 
on an analysis of the unique combination of factors for the 
specific program being negotiated. Controversy has existed
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over the actual level and trend of profits for defense con­
tractors. In general, profit levels have fallen. This fact 
has led to a flight of capital from the defense industry.
These conditions have been acknowledged, and it is anticipated 
that the profit rates on defense contracts will increase in 
the future.
Technically, a cost growth occurs when actual cost is 
greater than the initial estimate for a program. The very 
nature of scientific exploration as encompassed by the re­
search and development spectrum tends toward cost-prediction 
errors. The initial estimates for a contract which are 
based on projection of costs into an unknown future are sub­
ject to a large degree of error. Cost growths are not the 
exclusive domain of the Department of Defense. From antiq­
uity, a Roman example was considered, as well as some modern 
ones where commercial ventures have experienced cost growths. 
The causes of cost growths were classified as either preac­
tivation or activation. Preactivation refers to the time 
period between technical and cost proposal preparation and 
the time the contract is signed by both parties. Activation 
refers to the part of the procurement cycle which includes 
contract administration and closure. The causes of cost 
growths as reported in the literature were listed in Table 
5, beginning on page 88. Each factor was then discussed.
Historically, the FFP contract has been the type of 
support document deeded most desirable to procure supplies
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and services for the government. Related to this preference 
was the emphasis placed on formal advertising as the preferred 
process for placing contracts. The combination did not serve 
well as supporting mechanisms for scientific programs. The 
multiple uncertainties inherent in research and development 
programs contributed to cost growths. A representative 
sampling of the efforts to cope with cost growths was ex­
amined. The attempts were classified under the headings of 
preactivation, activation, and environmental patterns. Pre- 
activation measures considered techniques, such as type of 
contract, the "Should Cost" concept, design policy, con­
tractual provisions, stimulation of competition, and multi­
year procurements. Activation techniques included delegation 
of additional authority to program managers, control of de­
sign changes, use of mathematical science techniques in the 
management process, the Value Engineering Program, growth of 
management systems, improved financial status of contractors, 
and efforts to rate contractor performance. Under the en­
vironmental patterns heading, factors were considered, such 
as centralization and decentralization of decision making, 
the implementation of the program definition phase, the total 
package procurement plan, and commonality. One measure of 
cost performance effectiveness for contractors is to compare 
the actual program costs with those estimated for the pro­
gram initially. Three sample time periods were examined to 
determine if a trend could be detected. The trend disclosed
17^
was one of increased cost growths. Thus, over the twenty- 
year period examined, measures to reduce cost growths have 
apparently not been too effective.
Four parameters and their interactions emerged as 
the key conceptual issues. The parameters were time, uncer­
tainty , information, and cost. In communication theory, in­
formation relates to the number of choices available to the 
decision maker, or to the number of possible events that 
could occur. Thus, this term does not encompass meaning.
The expression, informational efficacy, was adopted to convey 
meaning or value. Entropy is a measure of the amount of in­
formation in a system; in particular, it encompasses the 
number of choices available to the decision maker. Entropy 
relates to the degree of randomness of the information, not 
to informational efficacy. As entropy increases, information 
increases, uncertainty increases, freedom of choice increases, 
but the informational efficacy decreases as related to a 
specific data source. In a closed system the tendency is 
for entropy to increase. What is needed is a source of nega­
tive entropy to counter this propensity. In other words, the 
informational efficacy of the data in the system needs to be 
augmented. As the entropy or number of choices increases, 
the total uncertainty in the situation increases. The amount 
of uncertainty as to the occurrence of any individual event 
can be measured by probability. The factor permits the en­
tropy for a probability distribution to be measured. These
1 7 5
concepts in conjunction with the concept of economic cost 
permitted a conceptual cost model to he developed. A key as­
sumption of the model was that the effective cost for a de­
velopmental program may be represented by the ratio of target 
costs to the informational efficacy of the data in a closed 
system. Manipulation of the conceptual cost model demon­
strated several principles. As the level of informational 
efficacy increases, the costs for a developmental program de­
crease. Over time, the cost for informational efficacy in­
creases at an increasing rate. This cost is essentially the 
price of program administration. These cost relationships 
imply that a total economic cost approach is imperative. 
Suboptimal decisions can occur, if the economic program cost 
is considered in isolation. Rather, the total-cost approach 
is the touchstone. The total-system approach dictates that 
total economic cost will be minimized. In this context, a 
cost growth may be warranted if the over-all cost will be at 
a minimum. The role of the management information system is 
to provide proper cost visibility. The characteristics of an 
effective management information system were considered. A 
computer program may be developed to simulate the contract 
administration process as reflected by the conceptual cost 
model. The parameters of time, cost, uncertainty, entropy, 
and informational efficacy may be manipulated to simulate 
various world states. Basically, simulation permits the 
identification of successive states of the situation by the
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repetitive application of the rules that govern a system.
Using the model, no magic number can be derived for the future 
cost of a program. The best estimate will still intrinsically 
incorporate an indeterminate measure of uncertainty. The 
value of the model relates to its explanatory capabilities.
The model illustrates the relationship between program cost 
and the disorder in a contract administration system. This 
disorder is created by warp factors in the current and fu­
ture environments. The objective is to better understand 
cost growths and their causes. The logical consistency of 
the assumptions of the model were checked by symbolic logic. 
They were found to be logically consistent.
A methodology for the evaluation of cost estimates 
for developmental programs was examined. The preparation and 
evaluation of cost estimates to a degree is an art, not a 
science. However, management and financial science tech­
niques can aid the decision maker in the process of orderly 
and logical thinking. The objective of such techniques is to 
reduce uncertainty, rather than its complete elimination.
Three techniques used for the estimation of costs were 
examined briefly. The three approaches are the industrial 
engineering, statistical, and analogy. For most situations 
statistical procedures are preferred. This preference ac­
crues primarily from the flexibility and generality of the 
approach. Some aids to cost analysis were considered, such 
as the 80-20 Rule, the law of large numbers, and the fallacy
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of composition. The conclusion emerged that cost and risk 
analysis should be combined into cost uncertainty analysis, 
and each aggregate cost estimate should include a section 
which evaluates cost uncertainties. The decision tree, a 
graphical-sequential technique, was adopted as a decision 
tool. The application of probabilities to the decision-tree 
choices permitted the calculation of the probability that a 
given event will occur. New information which reduces the 
degree of uncertainty will often lead to the revision of 
probabilities and permit the individual to modify his previous 
decision. Bayes' Theorem was applied to illustrate the ap­
proach. The value of new information gathered for the re­
duction and resolution of program uncertainty was demon­
strated. Also the use of an individual's utility function 
as an aid to decision making was considered. In conclusion, 
the impossibility of eliminating uncertainty in the decision­
making environment is acknowledged. However, the efficacious 
manager will take action to reduce it to a minimal level.
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GLOSSARY
Algorithm: A sequential procedure for performing a mathe­
matical routine in a given number of steps.
Bellman's Principle of Optimality: The principle requires
that all decisions in a sequence must maintain the 
integrity of the initial decision. A necessary as­
sumption is that the initial decision established 
an optimal policy.
Bias Effect: The contractor inflates the target cost for an
incentive contract. A contract underrun is caused 
by this inflation of cost estimates, rather than by 
cost reduction efforts.
Buy American: A congressional Act that requires items
purchased for public consumption to be mined or pro­
duced in the United States.
Certainty: Each decision leads to a predictable outcome. No
doubt as to the final outcome is possible.
Cost Optimism: A contractor bids low in an effort to con­
vince the contracting agency that a program's costs 
are low enough to be funded.
Cost Visibility: Management efforts are expended to insure
that program costs are known and under control.
Davis bacon: An Act governing the payment of wages under
Government construction contracts. Substandard 
wages are prohibited.
Dynamic Programming: An orderly approach for searching out
a specific sequence of decisions which optimizes some 
predefined objective function.
Engagement: Continuous communications are maintained with a
contractor in order to effect adequate program con­trol.
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Entropy t The term encompasses the number of choices avail­
able to a given decision maker.
Heuristic ; The term involves the systematic use of trial and 
error methods for obtaining solutions to problems.
Incentive Effect: Cost reduction and control are the goals
of incentive contracting. The incentive for the 
contractor is increased profits. The incentive 
effect is operative when increased profits result 
from contractor efforts to control and reduce costs.
Information: The term relates to the number of choices
available to the decision maker. The amount of 
information is measured by the logarithm of the 
number of available choices.
Informational Efficacy: This expression refers to the con­
tent or meaning of a unit of information. It is
synonomous with order in a closed system.
Negentropy: A measure of the amount of informational ef­
ficacy present in a closed system.
Risk: The totality of outcomes for a given variable can be
described by a probability distribution.
Stochastic Process: A random process which leads to more
than one possible outcome. The possible occurrence 
of any given outcome is uncertain.
Uncertainty: The known is completely dominated by the un­
known. The probability distributions for future 
events are not known.
Walsh Healey: An Act passed by Congress in 1936 that pro­
hibits the payment of substandard vmges to workers 
under the provisions of Government supply contracts. 
It provides the same coverage for the supply area 
that the Davis-Bacon Act guarantees to construction 
workers.
Warp Factors: The term includes environmental factors, such
as excessive wage settlements, unexpected technical 
problems and communication problems, which are at 
best only partially under the control of the program 
manager for a given contract.
